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Abstract
Recently, it has been shown that the time-varying multiple-access channel (MAC) with perfect channel state
information (CSI) at the receiver and delayed feedback CSI at the transmitters can be modeled as the finite state
MAC (FS-MAC) with delayed state feedback, where the time variation of the channel is characterized by the statistics
of the underlying state process. To study the fundamental limit of the secure transmission over multi-user wireless
communication systems, we re-visit the FS-MAC with delayed state feedback by considering an external eavesdropper,
which we call the finite state multiple-access wiretap channel (FS-MAC-WT) with delayed feedback. The main
contribution of this paper is to show that taking full advantage of the delayed channel output feedback helps to
increase the secrecy rate region of the FS-MAC-WT with delayed state feedback, and the results of this paper are
further illustrated by a degraded Gaussian fading example.
Index Terms
Delayed feedback, finite-state Markov channel, multiple-access channel, secrecy capacity region, wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the future 5G network, a huge amount of private information, e.g. personal financial data and medical records,
will be transmitted through wireless channels. Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless communication, infor-
mation transmitted in the wireless channels is more vulnerable to eavesdropping, and thus the secure transmission
over the wireless channels is one of the most pressing problems in the design of 5G network. The physical layer
security (PLS) is a useful tool to solve the secure transmission problem in the 5G network, and it was founded by
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2Wyner [1] in his milestone paper on the wiretap channel. In [1], Wyner introduced secrecy criteria into a physically
degraded broadcast channel, and proposed the notion of secrecy capacity to characterize the maximum achievable
secrecy rate. Secrecy capacities of the discrete memoryless and Gaussian cases of the physically degraded wiretap
channel are respectively determined in [1] and [2]. Later, Csisza´r et al. [3] extended Wyner’s physically degraded
model [1] to the general broadcast channel with confidential messages (BC-CM), where an additional common
message was transmitted together with the confidential message, and this common message was allowed to be
decoded by the eavesdropper. Secrecy capacity regions of the discrete memoryless and Gaussian cases of the BC-
CM are respectively determined in [3] and [4]. The coding schemes proposed in [1] and [3] have become standard
techniques for the theory of PLS.
Based on the work of [1] and [3], recently, the wireless fading channel is modeled as the parallel wiretap channel
[4], [5], where the transition probability of the channel depends on the channel state information (CSI), the CSI
is assumed to be i.i.d. generated, the channel is discrete memoryless for a given CSI, the overall channel can be
decomposed into several sub-channels, and the transition probability of each sub-channel is with respect to a certain
value of the CSI. Liang et al. [4], [5] established the secrecy capacity of this parallel wiretap channel model, and
further derived the secrecy capacity of the corresponding fading wiretap channel. Here note that the fading wiretap
channel in [4], [5] is also assumed to be equipped with i.i.d. generated CSI, and the CSI is known by the legitimate
receiver and the transmitter. Besides the work of [4], [5], other related works in the wiretap channel with i.i.d. CSI
are in [6]-[9], and the recent results on the PLS of multi-user channel models in the presence of i.i.d. CSI are in
[10]-[12].
In practical wireless fading channels, the CSI at each time instant is not independent of each other. A practical
model for the wireless fading channel with CSI was provided in [13] and [14], which was called the finite state
Markov channel (FSMC). The CSI in the FSMC is not i.i.d., and in fact it goes through a Markov process. The
capacity of the FSMC was first studied by Goldsmith et al. [15], where the channel capacity was characterized
in a multi-letter form. A single-letter form of the capacity of the FSMC was investigated by Viswanathan [16].
In [16], Viswanathan investigated the scenario that the CSI of the FSMC is entirely known by the receiver, and
the receiver sends the CSI together with the received channel output back to the transmitter through a noiseless
feedback channel. Since this feedback is often not instantaneous, Viswanathan assumed that the transmitter gets
the feedback CSI and channel output after some time delay. The communication scenario described in [16] is
called the FSMC with delayed feedback, and the capacity of this model was determined in a single-letter form.
Moreover, Viswanathan further found out that the feedback channel output does not help to increase the channel
capacity, which is similar to Shannon’s classical fact that the channel output feedback makes no contribution to the
capacity of a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) [27]. Later, Basher et al. [17] extended Viswanathan’s work [16]
to a multiple-access situation, which was called the finite state multiple-access channel (FS-MAC) with delayed
state feedback. In this extended model, the receiver sends the state back to the two transmitters via two noiseless
feedback channels, respectively, and the transmitters receive the state after some time delay. The capacity region
of this extended model is also determined in a single-letter form.
For the upcoming 5G wireless networks, establishing more practical PLS models for the mobile communication
3systems attracts researchers’ interest. In [18], [19], a multi-letter form of the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel
with memory CSI is given, which is not computable. Single-letter form of the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel
with dependent CSI remains open. Recently, Dai et al. [20] re-visited the wiretap channel with dependent CSI by
considering the situation that the CSI goes through a Markov process, it is entirely obtained by the legal receiver
and the eavesdropper, and the transmitter obtains the CSI via a feedback channel after some time delay. Dai et al.
[20] determined the secrecy capacity (in a single-letter form) of this model for a degraded case.
In this paper, establishing a more practical PLS model for the up-link of the wireless communication systems
motivates us to study the finite state multiple-access wiretap channel (FS-MAC-WT) with delayed feedback, see the
following Figure 1. The transition probability of the channel is governed by a state S which goes through a Markov
process. At time i, the legal receiver obtains Yi and Si, and delivers them to the transmitters via two noiseless
feedback channels with delay times d1 and d2, respectively. The i-th time channel encoders produce the channel
inputs on the basis of the transmitted messages and the delayed feedback. In addition, at time i, an eavesdropper
receives Zi and also perfectly obtains Si. The delay times d1 and d2 are supposed to be entirely known by the
legal receiver, the eavesdropper and the transmitters. Here note that the FS-MAC-WT with delayed feedback in
Figure 1 combines Wyner’s wiretap channel [1] with Basher et al.’s FS-MAC with delayed state feedback [17].
Unlike Viswanathan’s fact that the feedback channel output does not help to increase the channel capacity [16], we
find out that the full use of the delayed feedback channel output may increase the achievable secrecy rate region
of the FS-MAC-WT with delayed state feedback, where the “full use” indicates that the feedback channel output
can not only be used to produce secret keys known by the legal receiver and the transmitters 1, but also be used
to allow the transmitters to cooperate with each other. The main contribution of this paper is to provide inner
and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region of the FS-MAC-WT with delayed feedback. From a degraded
Gaussian fading example, we show the effects of feedback delay and channel memory on the secrecy sum rate of
the FS-MAC-WT with delayed feedback, and show that the channel output feedback enhances the capacity bounds
for the FS-MAC-WT with only delayed state feedback.
Throughout this paper, random variables are written in uppercase letter (e.g. V ), real values are written in
lowercase letter (e.g. v), and alphabets are written in calligraphic letter (e.g. V). The random vector and its value
are written in a similar way. The probability Pr{V = v} is shortened by PV (v). In addition, for the remainder of
this paper, the base of the logarithm is 2. The outline of this paper is organized as follows. The definitions and the
main results are given in Section II; a degraded Gaussian fading example is shown in Section III; and a summary
of this work is given in Section IV.
II. DEFINITIONS AND THE MAIN RESULTS
Now we consider the FS-MAC-WT with state at the legal receiver and delayed feedback at the transmitters
with delays d1 and d2, respectively, as shown in Figure 1. The remainder of this section is organized as follows.
1The idea of using noiseless feedback to produce secret key encrypting the transmitted message is from Ahlswede and Cai’s work on the
wiretap channel with noiseless feedback [21]
4Fig. 1: The FS-MAC-WT with delayed feedback
Subsection II-A is about the definitions of the channel, Subsection II-B is about the code description, and Subsection
II-C is about the main results.
A. Channel Model
The channel consists of two transmitters, one legal receiver and an eavesdropper. Each transmitter j ∈ {1, 2}
chooses a message Wj with equal probability from the set {1, 2, ..., 2NRj} and independent of the other transmitter.
At each time instant, the channel is in one of a finite number of states S = {s1, s2, ..., sk}. In each state, the channel
is discrete memoryless with inputs alphabet X1, X2 and outputs alphabet Y , Z . Let Si, X1,i, X2,i, Yi and Zi be
the channel inputs and outputs at time i (i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}). The channel transition probability at time i is governed
by the state Si and is given by PY,Z|X1,X2,S(yi, zi|x1,i, x2,i, si). Since the channel is discrete memoryless, we have
PY N ,ZN |XN1 ,XN2 ,SN (y
N , zN |xN1 , xN2 , sN ) =
N∏
i=1
PY,Z|X1,X2,S(yi, zi|x1,i, x2,i, si). (2.1)
The channel state process {Si} (i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}) is a stationary irreducible aperiodic ergodic Markov chain, and
given the previous states, the current state is independent of the channel inputs and outputs, i.e.,
Pr{Si = si|Xi1 = xi1, Xi2 = xi2, Y i = yi, Zi = zi, Si−1 = si−1} = Pr{Si = si|Si−1 = si−1}. (2.2)
The state process {Si} is also independent of the messages W1 and W2, and hence
Pr{SN = sN ,W1 = w1,W2 = w2} =
N∏
i=1
Pr{Si = si|Si−1 = si−1}Pr{W1 = w1}Pr{W2 = w2}. (2.3)
Denote the one-step transition probability matrix of the process {Si} by K, and the steady probability of the state
process {Si} by pi. Then the joint probability mass function Pr{Si = sl, Si−d = sj} can be expressed by
pid(Si = sl, Si−d = sj) = pi(sj)Kd(sl, sj), (2.4)
5where sl and sj are the l-th and j-th elements of the state alphabet S, respectively, and Kd(sl, sj) is the (l, j)-
th element of the d-step transition probability matrix Kd of the channel state process {Si}. Without loss of
generality, suppose that d1 ≥ d2, which indicates that at time i, the delayed feedback state Si−d1 obtained
by the transmitter 1 is also known by the transmitter 2 because i− d1 ≤ i− d2, hence we have
Pr{Si = sl, Si−d1 = sj , Si−d2 = sv} = pi(sj)Kd1−d2(sv, sj)Kd2(sl, sv), (2.5)
where sl, sj , sv ∈ S.
B. Code Description
For the FS-MAC-WT with delayed feedback, an (N, 2NR1 , 2NR2 , d1, d2,∆, Pe) code is composed of
• Two message sets W1 = {1, 2, ..., 2NR1} and W2 = {1, 2, ..., 2NR2}.
• At time instant i (i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}), the channel encoder fji (j ∈ {1, 2}) depends only on the message Wj
and the delayed feedback Si−dj (or Si−dj and Y i−dj ). For the FS-MAC-WT with delayed state feedback, the
channel input Xj,i (j ∈ {1, 2}) at time instant i is defined by
Xj,i =
 fj,i(Wj), 1 ≤ i ≤ djfj,i(Wj , Si−dj ), dj + 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (2.6)
and for the FS-MAC-WT with delayed state and channel output feedback, the channel input Xj,i (j ∈ {1, 2})
is defined by
Xj,i =
 fj,i(Wj), 1 ≤ i ≤ djfj,i(Wj , Si−dj , Y i−dj ), dj + 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (2.7)
where the channel encoder fj,i (j ∈ {1, 2}) at time instant i is stochastic, i.e., the encoding function is a
random mapping (not deterministic).
• The channel decoder is a mapping ψ
ψ : YN × SN →W1 ×W2, (2.8)
that maps the legal receiver’s channel output Y N and the state SN into the message sets. The average decoding
error probability Pe is denoted by
Pe =
1
2N(R1+R2)
2NR1∑
w1=1
2NR2∑
w2=1
∑
sN
PSN (s
n)Pr{ψ(yN , sN ) 6= (w1, w2)|(w1, w2) was sent}. (2.9)
• Since state SN is also perfectly known by the eavesdropper, his equivocation about the messages is denoted
by
∆ =
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN , SN ). (2.10)
Applying similar criteria in [1] and [3], we define an achievable secrecy rate pair (R1, R2) as follows. Given
a pair (R1, R2), if for arbitrarily small , there exists a sequence of (N, 2NR1 , 2NR2 , d1, d2,∆, Pe) codes
satisfying
log ‖ W1 ‖
N
≥ R1 − , log ‖ W2 ‖
N
≥ R2 − ,∆ ≥ R1 +R2 − , Pe ≤ , (2.11)
6the pair (R1, R2) is an achievable secrecy rate pair. Here we note that the joint secrecy ensures the individual
secrecy, i.e., 1NH(W1,W2|ZN , SN ) ≥ R1 + R2 −  implies that 1NH(Wj |ZN , SN ) ≥ Rj −  for j = 1, 2.
The proof of this property is in [22, p. 5691, Lemma 15], and thus we omit it here.
C. Main Results
The secrecy capacity region consists of all achievable secrecy rate pairs. Denote the secrecy capacity region of
the FS-MAC-WT with delayed state and channel output feedback by Csf , and the secrecy capacity region of the
FS-MAC-WT with only delayed state feedback by Cs. In the remainder of this subsection, the following Theorems
1 and 2 provide bounds on Csf , and Theorems 3 and 4 give bounds on Cs.
Theorem 1: An inner bound Cinsf on Csf is given by
Cinsf = {(R1, R2) : 0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, S, S˜1, S˜2, Q),
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1, S, S˜1, S˜2, Q),
0 ≤ R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(X1;Y |X2, S, S˜1, S˜2, Q) + I(X2;Y |X1, S, S˜1, S˜2, Q), I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2)}
−I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2) + min{I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2), H(Y |Z,X1, X2, S, S˜1, S˜2)},
where the joint probability
PQSS˜1S˜2X1X2Y Z(q, s, s˜1, s˜2, x1, x2, y, z)
= PY Z|X1X2S(y, z|x1, x2, s)PX1|S˜1,Q(x1|s˜1, q)PX2|S˜1,S˜2,Q(x2|s˜1, s˜2, q) ·
PQ|S˜1(q|s˜1)Kd2(s, s˜2)Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)pi(s1), (2.12)
and the cardinality of Q is bounded by |Q| ≤ 2.
Proof: The proof of |Q| ≤ 2 is directly from the support lemma [25, pp. 631-633], and thus we omit it
here. The inner bound Cinsf is constructed by using the block Markov coding strategy for the feedback system
and the multiplexing coding scheme for the FSMC with delayed state feedback [16], i.e., the messages W1 =
(W1,1, ...,W1,n) and W2 = (W2,1, ...,W2,n) are transmitted through n blocks, and in each block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n),
the messages W1,i = (W1,i,1, ...,W1,i,k) and W2,i = (W2,i,1, ...,W2,i,k) are divided into k sub-messages, where
W1,i,j and W2,i,j (1 ≤ j ≤ k) are with respect to the delayed feedback state si−d1 (here note that since d1 ≥ d2,
when transmitter 2 receives his delayed state si−d2, he also knows si−d1).
In each block i, split the sub-messages W1,i,j and W2,i,j into two part, i.e., W1,i,j = (W1,i,j,0,W1,i,j,1) and
W2,i,j = (W2,i,j,0,W2,i,j,1). Here the sub-messages W1,i,j,1 and W2,i,j,1 will be encrypted by keys produced
from the delayed channel output feedback, and similar to the random binning technique used in Wyner’s wiretap
channel [1], the sub-messages W1,i,j,0 and W2,i,j,0 will be respectively protected by the randomly produced dummy
messages W ∗1,i,j and W
∗
2,i,j . In each block, the sub-messages W1,i,j,0, W1,i,j,1 and the dummy message W
∗
1,i,j will
be encoded as a part of the codeword XN1 , and analogously, W2,i,j,0, W2,i,j,1 and W
∗
2,i,j will be encoded as a
part of the codeword XN2 . Finally, when the encoding for all the sub-messages of W1,i and W2,i are completed,
multiplexing all parts of XN1 and X
N
2 , the transmitted codewords are chosen to be transmitted.
7The auxiliary random variables S˜1 and S˜2 represent the delayed CSI Si−d1 and Si−d2 , respectively. In each
block i and for a fixed j, the auxiliary random variable Q represents a sub-sequence of qN encoded by all the
sub-messages W1,i−1,j,0, W1,i−1,j,1, W2,i−1,j,0, W2,i−1,j,1 and all the dummy messages W ∗1,i−1,j and W
∗
2,i−1,j for
the previous block i− 1 (here note that for i = 1, we define W1,i−1,j,0 = W1,i−1,j,1 = W2,i−1,j,0 = W2,i−1,j,1 =
W ∗1,i−1,j = W
∗
2,i−1,j = 1). In block i, the transmitter 1 (2) has already known the sequence q
n for block i, and he
attempts to decode the transmitter 2 (1)’s codeword by finding a unique xN2 (x
N
1 ) such that x
N
1 , x
N
2 , q
n, yN and
sN (here yN and sN are delayed feedback channel output and state, respectively) are jointly typical. When each
transmitter successfully decodes the other one’s codeword for block i, he extracts the messages in it, and chooses
the sequence qn for block i + 1 with encoded messages W1,i,j,0, W1,i,j,1, W2,i,j,0, W2,i,j,1, W ∗1,i,j and W
∗
2,i,j ,
where 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
From the above encoding scheme, we see that in each block, the delayed channel output feedback yN is not
only used to produce secret keys encrypting the sub-message W1,i,j,1 and W2,i,j,1, but also used to allow each
transmitter to decode the other one’s transmitted codeword. In Section III, we show that this full use of the delayed
channel output feedback helps to increase the achievable secrecy rate region of the FS-MAC-WT with only delayed
state feedback. The detail of the proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix A.
Theorem 2: An outer bound Coutsf on Csf is given by
Coutsf = {(R1, R2) : 0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2),
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(V2;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2),
0 ≤ R1 +R2 ≤ min{H(Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2, Z), I(V1, V2;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)}},
where
PUV1V2SS˜1S˜2X1X2Y Z(u, v1, v2, s, s˜1, s˜2, x1, x2, y, z)
= PY Z|X1X2S(y, z|x1, x2, s)PUV1V2SS˜1S˜2X1X2(u, v1, v2, s, s˜1, s˜2, x1, x2), (2.13)
U may be assumed to be a (deterministic) function of V1 and V2, and the alphabets of the auxiliary random
variables U , V1 and V2 satisfy |U| ≤ |X1||X2||S| + 2, |V1| ≤ (|X1||X2||S| + 1)(|X1||X2||S| + 2) and |V2| ≤
(|X1||X2||S|+ 1)(|X1||X2||S|+ 2), respectively.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The following Theorems 3 and 4 show the inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region Cs of the
FS-MAC-WT with delayed state feedback.
Theorem 3: An inner bound Cins on Cs is given by
Cins = {(R1, R2) : 0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− I(X1;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q),
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1, S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− I(X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q),
0 ≤ R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)},
where the joint probability mass function PQSS˜1S˜2X1X2Y Z(q, s, s˜1, s˜2, x1, x2, y, z) is given by (2.12), and the
cardinality of the auxiliary random variable Q satisfies |Q| ≤ 6.
8Proof: Here Q is a standard time sharing random variable which is used to increase the achievable secrecy
rate region Cins . The proof of |Q| ≤ 6 is directly from the support lemma [25, pp. 631-633], and thus we omit
it here. The inner bound Cins is constructed by simply combining Wyner’s random binning coding scheme for the
wiretap channel [1] with the multiplexing coding scheme for the FSMC with delayed state feedback [16], i.e., the
transmitted messages W1 = (W1,1, ...,W1,k) and W2 = (W2,1, ...,W2,k) are divided into k sub-messages, where
W1,j and W2,j (1 ≤ j ≤ k) are with respect to the delayed feedback state si−d1.
The sub-messages W1,j and W2,j will be respectively protected by the randomly produced dummy messages
W ∗1,j and W
∗
2,j , i.e., the sub-messages Wi,j (i = 1, 2) together with the dummy message W
∗
i,j will be encoded as
a part of the codeword XNi . Finally, when the encoding for all the sub-messages of W1 and W2 are completed,
multiplexing all parts of XNi , the entire transmitted codeword X
N
i is chosen to be transmitted. The legal receiver
attempts to find unique xN1 and x
N
2 such that x
N
1 , x
N
2 , y
N and sN are jointly typical.
The achievability proof of Theorems 3 is similar to that of the multiple-access wiretap channel [24], and hence
we omit the proof here.
Theorem 4: An outer bound Couts on Cs is given by
Couts = {(R1, R2) : 0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(V1;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2, U)− I(V1;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, U),
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(V2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2, U)− I(V2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, U),
0 ≤ R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1, V2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2, U)− I(V1, V2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, U)},
where the joint probability PUV1V2SS˜1S˜2X1X2Y Z(u, v1, v2, s, s˜1, s˜2, x1, x2, y, z) is given by (2.13), U may be as-
sumed to be a (deterministic) function of V1 and V2, and the alphabets of the auxiliary random variables U , V1 and V2
satisfy |U| ≤ |X1||X2||S|+1, |V1| ≤ (|X1||X2||S|+2)(|X1||X2||S|+3) and |V2| ≤ (|X1||X2||S|+2)(|X1||X2||S|+3),
respectively.
Proof: First, note that the bounds on the cardinality of the auxiliary random variables U , V1 and V2 are directly
from the support lemma [25, pp. 633-634], and thus we omit the proof here. Then, the outer bound Couts is obtained
by the following steps:
• Using the definition (2.11) (including 1NH(Wj |ZN , SN ) ≥ Rj −  for j = 1, 2) and Fano’s inequality, the
secrecy transmission rates R1, R2 and R1 +R2 are upper bounded by 1N (I(W1;Y
N |SN )− I(W1;ZN |SN )),
1
N (I(W2;Y
N |SN )− I(W2;ZN |SN )) and 1N (I(W1,W2;Y N |SN )− I(W1,W2;ZN |SN )), respectively.
• The definition of the auxiliary random variables in Couts follows that in [3]. To be specific, in [3], Csisza´r
and Ko¨rner define the auxiliary random variable Ui as Ui , (Y i−1, ZNi+1). In this paper, considering the
delayed feedback states Si−d1 and Si−d2 , we slightly modify the definition of Ui in [3], i.e., we define
Ui , (Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN ), and here note that Si−d1 and Si−d2 are included in SN . Then, similar to the definition
in [3], we let V1,i , (Ui,W1) and V2,i , (Ui,W2).
• Applying chain rule and the above definitions of the auxiliary random variables Ui, V1,i and V2,i into the
upper bounds of R1, R2 and R1 + R2, and using Csisza´r’s equality [3] to eliminate some identities in these
bounds, the outer bound Couts is obtained.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2, hence we omit the proof here.
9III. DEGRADED GAUSSIAN FADING EXAMPLE
A. Capacity Results on the Degraded Gaussian Fading Case
In this subsection, we compute the bounds in Theorems 1-4 for a degraded Gaussian fading case. and investigate
how the delays d1 and d2 affect the secrecy rate regions.
For the degraded Gaussian fading case, at time instant i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ), the channel inputs and outputs satisfy
Yi = h1(si)X1,i + h2(si)X2,i +Nsi , Zi = h3(si)Yi +Nw,i, (3.14)
where si is the i-th time channel state which goes through a Markov process, hj(si) (j = 1, 2) is the fading process
of the transmitter j, and h3(si) is the fading process of the eavesdropper. In this example, we assume that h1(si),
h2(si) and h3(si) are related with the i-th time channel state si. The noise Nsi for the legal receiver is Gaussian
distributed with zero mean and variance σ2si depending on the state si. The noise Nw,i for the eavesdropper is also
Gaussian distributed with zero mean and constant variance σ2w, i.e., Nw,i ∼ N (0, σ2w) for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. Let
P1 and P2 be the power constraints satisfying∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)E[X
2
1 |s˜1] ≤ P1, (3.15)
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)E[X22 |s˜1, s˜2] ≤ P2. (3.16)
At time instant i, the legal receiver receives the state Si and his own channel output Yi, and then he sends Si (or
Si and Yi) back to the transmitter j (j = 1, 2) after a delay time dj . The steady probability distribution and the one
step transition probability matrix of the state are denoted by pi(s) and K, respectively. The following Corollaries 1-2
provide bounds on the secrecy capacity region C(dg)s of the degraded Gaussian fading FS-MAC-WT with delayed
state feedback, and Corollaries 3-4 provide bounds on the secrecy capacity region C(dg)sf of the degraded Gaussian
fading FS-MAC-WT with delayed state and channel output feedback.
Corollary 1: An inner bound Cdg−ins on C(dg)s is given by
Cdg−ins
=
⋃
P1(s˜1),P2(s˜1,s˜2)

(R1, R2) : R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
sK
d2(s, s˜2)(
1
2 log(1 +
h21(s)P1(s˜1)
σ2s
)
− 12 log(h
2
3(s)h
2
1(s)P1(s˜1)+h23(s)h22(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)+h23(s)σ2s+σ2w
h23(s)h
2
2(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)+h23(s)σ2s+σ2w )),
R2 ≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
sK
d2(s, s˜2)(
1
2 log(1 +
h22(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)
σ2s
)
− 12 log(h
2
3(s)h
2
1(s)P1(s˜1)+h23(s)h22(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)+h23(s)σ2s+σ2w
h23(s)h
2
1(s)P1(s˜1)+h23(s)σ2s+σ2w )),
R1 +R2 ≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
sK
d2(s, s˜2)·
( 12 log(1 +
h21(s)P1(s˜1)+h22(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)
σ2s
)
− 12 log(1 + h
2
3(s)h
2
1(s)P1(s˜1)+h23(s)h22(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)
h23(s)σ
2
s+σ
2
w
)),

,
where P1(s˜1) is the power allocated to the state s˜1, i.e., P1(s˜1) = E[X21 |s˜1], and P2(s˜1, s˜2) is the power allocated
to the states s˜1 and s˜2, i.e., P2(s˜1, s˜2) = E[X22 |s˜1, s˜2], and they satisfy∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)P1(s˜1) ≤ P1, (3.17)
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∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)P2(s˜1, s˜2) ≤ P2. (3.18)
Proof: The inner bound Cdg−ins is obtained by letting the time sharing random variable Q be a constant, and
substituting (3.14), X1(s˜1) ∼ N (0,P1(s˜1)) and X2(s˜1, s˜2) ∼ N (0,P2(s˜1, s˜2)) into Theorem 3, and thus we omit
the proof here.
Corollary 2: An outer bound Cdg−outs on C(dg)s is given by
Cdg−outs
=
⋃
P1(s˜1),P2(s˜1,s˜2)

(R1, R2) : R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
sK
d2(s, s˜2)(
1
2 log(1 +
h21(s)P1(s˜1)
σ2s
)
− 12 log( h
2
1(s)P1(s˜1)+σ2s+σ2w
h23(s)h
2
2(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)+h23(s)σ2s+σ2w )),
R2 ≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
sK
d2(s, s˜2)(
1
2 log(1 +
h22(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)
σ2s
)
− 12 log( h
2
2(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)+σ2s+σ2w
h23(s)h
2
1(s)P1(s˜1)+h23(s)σ2s+σ2w )),
R1 +R2 ≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
sK
d2(s, s˜2)·
( 12 log(1 +
h21(s)P1(s˜1)+h22(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)
σ2s
)
− 12 log(1 + h
2
3(s)h
2
1(s)P1(s˜1)+h23(s)h22(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)
h23(s)σ
2
s+σ
2
w
)),

,
where P1(s˜1) and P2(s˜1, s˜2) satisfy (A57) and (A58), respectively.
Proof: The outer bound Cdg−outs is obtained by the following two steps:
• First, note that for the discrete memoryless degraded FS-MAC-WT with delayed state feedback, it is not
difficult to show that the outer bound Couts on the secrecy capacity region is exactly the same as the inner
bound Cins , except that the joint probability distribution is not defined by (2.12), and it is given by
PQSS˜1S˜2X1X2Y Z(q, s, s˜1, s˜2, x1, x2, y, z)
= PZ|Y (z|y)PY |X1,X2,S(y|x1, x2, s)PX1X2SS˜1S˜2Q(x1, x2, s, s˜1, s˜2, q). (3.19)
• Then applying the outer bound for the degraded FS-MAC-WT with delayed state feedback, and using the
entropy power inequality and the definitions of P1(s˜1) and P2(s˜1, s˜2) (see Corollary 1), it is not difficult to
show that Cdg−outs is obtained. The detail of the proof is omitted here.
The following Corollaries 3-4 provide bounds on the secrecy capacity region C(dg)sf of the degraded Gaussian
fading FS-MAC-WT with delayed state and channel output feedback.
Corollary 3: An inner bound C(dg−in)sf on C(dg)sf is given by
Cdg−insf
11
=
⋃
P1(s˜1),P2(s˜1,s˜2)

(R1, R2) : R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
sK
d2(s, s˜2)
1
2 log(1 +
h21(s)P1(s˜1)
σ2s
),
R2 ≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
sK
d2(s, s˜2)
1
2 log(1 +
h22(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)
σ2s
),
R1 +R2 ≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
sK
d2(s, s˜2)·
( 12 log(1 +
h21(s)P1(s˜1)+h22(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)
σ2s
)− 12 log(1 + h
2
3(s)h
2
1(s)P1(s˜1)+h23(s)h22(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)
h23(s)σ
2
s+σ
2
w
)
+ min{ 12 log(1 + h
2
3(s)h
2
1(s)P1(s˜1)+h23(s)h22(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)
h23(s)σ
2
s+σ
2
w
), 12 log(2pieσ
2
w) +
1
2 log
σ2s
h23(s)σ
2
s+σ
2
w
}),

,
where P1(s˜1) and P2(s˜1, s˜2) satisfy (A57) and (A58), respectively.
Proof: The inner bound Cdg−insf is obtained by letting the time sharing random variable Q be a constant, and
substituting (3.14), X1(s˜1) ∼ N (0,P1(s˜1)) and X2(s˜1, s˜2) ∼ N (0,P2(s˜1, s˜2)) into Theorem 1, and thus we omit
the proof here.
Corollary 4: An outer bound Cdg−outsf on C(dg)sf is given by
Cdg−outsf
=
⋃
P1(s˜1),P2(s˜1,s˜2)

(R1, R2) : R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
sK
d2(s, s˜2)
1
2 log(1 +
h21(s)P1(s˜1)+h22(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)
σ2s
),
R2 ≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
sK
d2(s, s˜2)
1
2 log(1 +
h21(s)P1(s˜1)+h22(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)
σ2s
),
R1 +R2 ≤ min{
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
sK
d2(s, s˜2)·
1
2 log(1 +
h21(s)P1(s˜1)+h22(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)
σ2s
),∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
sK
d2(s, s˜2)·
( 12 log(2pieσ
2
w) +
1
2 log(
h21(s)P1(s˜1)+h22(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)+σ2s
h23(s)(h
2
1(s)P1(s˜1)+h22(s)P2(s˜1,s˜2)+σ2s)+σ2w ))},

,
where P1(s˜1) and P2(s˜1, s˜2) satisfy (A57) and (A58), respectively.
Proof: The outer bound Cdg−outsf is obtained by the following two steps:
• First, note that the three bounds in Theorem 2 can be further upper bounded by
R1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)
(a)
≤ I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2), (3.20)
R2 ≤ I(V2;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)
(b)
≤ I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2), (3.21)
R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(V1, V2;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2), H(Y |Z,U, S, S˜1, S˜2)}
(c)
≤ min{H(Y |S, S˜1, S˜2)−H(Y |X1, X2, S, S˜1, S˜2), H(Y |Z, S, S˜1, S˜2)}
= min{I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2), H(Y |Z, S, S˜1, S˜2)}, (3.22)
where (a) is from the Markov chain (V1, U)→ (S, S˜1, S˜2, X1, X2)→ Y , (b) is from (V2, U)→ (S, S˜1, S˜2, X1, X2)→
Y , and (c) is from (V1, V2, U)→ (S, S˜1, S˜2, X1, X2)→ Y .
• Using (3.20), (3.21), (3.22), the entropy power inequality and the definitions of P1(s˜1) and P2(s˜1, s˜2) (see
Corollary 1), it is not difficult to show that Cdg−outsf is obtained. The detail of the proof is omitted here.
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B. Numerical results on the Degraded Gaussian Fading Example
To gain some intuition on the bounds shown in Subsection III-B, in this subsection, we study a simple two-state
case where the state alphabet S contains only two elements G (good state) and B (bad state). The noise variance
of the channel in state G is σ2G, and in state B is σ
2
B . Here σ
2
B > σ
2
G. The state process of this two-state case is
shown in Figure 2, and it is given by
P (G|G) = 1− b, P (B|G) = b, P (B|B) = 1− g, P (G|B) = g. (3.23)
Moreover, the steady probabilities of the states G and B are given by
pi(G) =
g
g + b
, pi(B) =
b
g + b
. (3.24)
Fig. 2: The transition probabilities of the two-state case
Let u = 1 − g − b and c = g/b. Here note that in [26], the authors show that u is with respect to the channel
memory, i.e., the channel memory is a monotonic increasing function of u. Moreover, from (3.24), it is obvious
that the steady state distributions depend on c. For the case that d1 = d2 = d (which implies that the delays for
the transmitters are the same) and a fixed c (e.g., c = 1), the following Figure 3 shows the effects of the delay
d and the channel memory u on the maximum achievable secrecy sum rate Rdg−fsum in C(dg−in)sf (Theorem 3) for
P1 = P2 = 100, σ2G = 1, σ2w = 400, h1(g) = 1, h1(b) = 0.5, h2(g) = 1, h2(b) = 0.7, h3(g) = 0.8, h3(b) = 0.2,
c = 1 and different values of u and σ2B . In addition, for the case that d1 = d and d2 = 0 (which implies that there
is no delay for the transmitter 2) and a fixed c = 1, the following Figure 4 shows the effects of the delay d and the
channel memory u on the maximum achievable secrecy sum rate Rdg−fsum in C(dg−in)sf for P1 = P2 = 100, σ2G = 1,
σ2w = 400, h1(g) = 1, h1(b) = 0.5, h2(g) = 1, h2(b) = 0.7, h3(g) = 0.8, h3(b) = 0.2, c = 1 and different values
of u and σ2B . From Figs. 3 and 4, we see that the maximum achievable secrecy sum rate is approaching the infinite
asymptote while the delay d is increasing, and the secrecy sum rate is changing rapidly while the channel memory
u is decreasing. Moreover, it is easy to see that Rdg−fsum is increasing while σB is decreasing, and this is because
for a given σ2G, the decrease of σB implies the decrease of the average channel noise.
For P1 = P2 = 100, σ2G = 1, g = b = 0.05, h1(g) = 1, h1(b) = 0.5, h2(g) = 1, h2(b) = 0.7, h3(g) = 1,
h3(b) = 0.9, d1 = 100, d2 = 10 and several values of σ2w and σB , the following Figs. 5 and 6 show the inner and
outer bounds on the secrecy capacity regions of the degraded Gaussian fading case of Figure 1 with or without
channel output feedback, and the capacity region C(dg∗) of the FS-MAC with only delayed state feedback (see [17,
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Fig. 3: The maximum secrecy sum rates versus delays d1 = d2 = d for P1 = P2 = 100, σ2G = 1, σ2w = 400,
h1(g) = 1, h1(b) = 0.5, h2(g) = 1, h2(b) = 0.7, h3(g) = 0.8, h3(b) = 0.2, c = 1 and several values of u and σ2B
pp.3442-3443(equations 57,60,62)]). From Figure 5, we see that C(dg−in)sf is larger than C(dg−in)s (even as large as
C(dg∗), which indicates that the Shannon capacity is achieved). Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 6, we see that the
gap between C(dg−in)s and C(dg−in)sf is increasing while σ2w is decreasing. From Figure 6, we see that the inner
bounds C(dg−in)s and C(dg−in)sf respectively meet the outer bounds C(dg−out)s and C(dg−out)sf when σ2w is small, and
this is because when σ2w is small enough, the bounds on the individual rates are larger than the bound on the
sum rate, and the sum rate bounds of C(dg−in)s and C(dg−in)sf are respectively approaching those of C(dg−out)s and
C(dg−out)sf . Moreover, from Figs. 5-6, we see that for fixed σG, σ2w, h1(g), h1(b), h2(g), h2(b), h3(g), h3(b), d1 and
d2, all the bounds (C(dg−in)s , C(dg−out)s , C(dg−in)sf , C(dg−out)sf , C(dg∗)) are enlarging while σB is decreasing, which
is due to the fact that the decrease of σB indicates the decrease of the average channel noise.
IV. SUMMARY
In this paper, we investigate the FS-MAC-WT with delayed feedback. Bounds on the secrecy capacity region of
this model are provided, and the achievability of the inner bound implies that the legal receiver’s delayed channel
output feedback can be not only used to allow the transmitters to cooperate with each other, but also used to
produce secret keys encrypting the transmitted messages. The capacity results are further explained via a degraded
Gaussian fading example. Numerical result of this example shows that the maximum achievable secrecy sum rate
is approaching the infinite asymptote while the delays are increasing, and the secrecy sum rate is changing rapidly
while the channel memory is decreasing. Moreover, from this example, we see that feeding back the legal receiver’s
channel output greatly enhances the achievable secrecy rate region of the FS-MAC-WT with only delayed state
14
Fig. 4: The maximum secrecy sum rates versus delays d1 = d and d2 = 0 for P1 = P2 = 100, σ2G = 1, σ2w = 400,
h1(g) = 1, h1(b) = 0.5, h2(g) = 1, h2(b) = 0.7, h3(g) = 0.8, h3(b) = 0.2, c = 1 and several values of u and σ2B
feedback. The result of this paper is an intermediate step toward understanding the secure transmission in wireless
communication networks with delayed feedback.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Several already existing coding strategies, such as block Markov coding strategy for the feedback systems,
generating secret keys from the legal receiver’s channel output feedback [21] and the decode-and-forward (DF)
strategy for the MAC with noiseless feedback [23], Wyner’s random binning technique [1] have been combined
with the multiplexing coding scheme for the FSMC with delayed state feedback [16] to show the achievability
of Theorem 1. Now the remainder of this section is organized as follows. Basic notations and definitions are
introduced in Subsection A-A, the coding scheme is shown in Subsection A-B, and the equivocation analysis is
given in Subsection A-C.
A. Basic notations and definitions
• The messages are transmitted over n blocks, and the codeword length in each block is N . Without loss of
generality, denote the state alphabet S by S = {1, 2, ..., k}, and note that the steady state probability pi(l) > 0
for all l ∈ S. In addition, denote Ns˜1 (1 ≤ s˜1 ≤ k) by
Ns˜1 = NPS˜1(s˜1)− 1, (A1)
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Fig. 5: The comparison of Cdg−insf , Cdg−outsf , Cdg−ins , Cdg−outs and Cdg∗ for P1 = P2 = 100, σ2G = 1, g = b = 0.05,
h1(g) = 1, h1(b) = 0.5, h2(g) = 1, h2(b) = 0.7, h3(g) = 1, h3(b) = 0.9, d1 = 100, d2 = 10, σ2w = 400 and
several values of σ2B
and Ns˜1,s˜2 (1 ≤ s˜1, s˜2 ≤ k) by
Ns˜1,s˜2 = NPS˜1S˜2(s˜1, s˜2)−
1
k
, (A2)
where 1 > 0 and 1 → 0 as N →∞. Here note that from (A1) and (A2), we have
k∑
s˜2=1
Ns˜1,s˜2 = Ns˜1 . (A3)
• The messages W1 = (W1,1, ...,W1,n) and W2 = (W2,1, ...,W2,n) are transmitted through n blocks. In
block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the transmitted message w1,i is denoted by w1,i = (w1,i,0, w1,i,1), where w1,i,0 ∈
{1, 2, ..., 2NR10} and w1,i,1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR11}. For a given delayed feedback state s˜1 (1 ≤ s˜1 ≤ k), we
further divide the messages w1,i,0 and w1,i,1 into k sub-messages, i.e., w1,i,0 = (w1,i,0,1, ..., w1,i,0,k) and
w1,i,1 = (w1,i,1,1, ..., w1,i,1,k), where for each s˜1, the messages w1,i,0,s˜1 and w1,i,1,s˜1 take values in the sets
{1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜1R10(s˜1)} and {1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜1R11(s˜1)}, respectively. Here note that
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)R10(s˜1) = R10, (A4)
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)R11(s˜1) = R11. (A5)
Analogously, the message w2,i is denoted by w2,i = (w2,i,0, w2,i,1), where w2,i,0 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR20} and
w2,i,1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR21}. For a given s˜1 (1 ≤ s˜1 ≤ k), define w2,i,0 = (w2,i,0,1, ..., w2,i,0,k) and w2,i,1 =
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Fig. 6: The comparison of Cdg−insf , Cdg−outsf , Cdg−ins , Cdg−outs and Cdg∗ for P1 = P2 = 100, σ2G = 1, g = b = 0.05,
h1(g) = 1, h1(b) = 0.5, h2(g) = 1, h2(b) = 0.7, h3(g) = 1, h3(b) = 0.9, d1 = 100, d2 = 10, σ2w = 1 and several
values of σ2B
(w2,i,1,1, ..., w2,i,1,k), where for each 1 ≤ s˜1 ≤ k, the messages w2,i,0,s˜1 and w2,i,1,s˜1 take values in the sets
{1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜1R20(s˜1)} and {1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜1R21(s˜1)}, respectively. Moreover, the messages w2,i,0,s˜1 and w2,i,1,s˜1
can be further divided by a given delayed state s˜2 (1 ≤ s˜2 ≤ k), i.e., w2,i,0,s˜1 = (w2,i,0,s˜1,1, ..., w2,i,0,s˜1,k),
w2,i,1,s˜1 = (w2,i,1,s˜1,1, ..., w2,i,1,s˜1,k), where w2,i,0,s˜1,s˜2 and w2,i,1,s˜1,s˜2 take values in the sets {1, 2, ...,
2Ns˜1,s˜2R20(s˜1,s˜2)} and {1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜1,s˜2R21(s˜1,s˜2)}, respectively. From the above definitions, it is easy to see
that
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)R20(s˜1) = R20, (A6)
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)R21(s˜1) = R21. (A7)
Moreover, we have
R20(s˜1) =
k∑
s˜2=1
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)R20(s˜1, s˜2)− ∗1, (A8)
R21(s˜1) =
k∑
s˜2=1
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)R21(s˜1, s˜2)− ∗2, (A9)
where ∗1 and 
∗
2 tend to zero while N tends to infinity.
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• For block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), let W ∗1,i and W ∗2,i be the dummy messages taking values in {1, 2, ..., 2NR
∗
1} and
{1, 2, ..., 2NR∗2}, respectively. Further divide W ∗1,i into k sub-messages, i.e., w∗1,i = (w∗1,i,1, ..., w∗1,i,k) and
for each 1 ≤ s˜1 ≤ k, the message w∗1,i,s˜1 takes values in the set {1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜1R
∗
1(s˜1)}. Similarly, let w∗2,i =
(w∗2,i,1, ..., w
∗
2,i,k), where for each 1 ≤ s˜1 ≤ k, the message w∗2,i,s˜1 takes values in the set {1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜1R
∗
2(s˜1)}.
Moreover, the message w∗2,i,s˜1 can be further divided by w
∗
2,i,s˜1
= (w∗2,i,s˜1,1, ..., w
∗
2,i,s˜1,k
), where for each
1 ≤ s˜2 ≤ k, the message w∗2,i,s˜1,s˜2 takes values in the set {1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜1,s˜2R
∗
2(s˜1,s˜2)}. Here note that
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)R
∗
1(s˜1) = R
∗
1, (A10)
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)R
∗
2(s˜1) = R
∗
2, (A11)
R∗2(s˜1) =
k∑
s˜2=1
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)R∗2(s˜1, s˜2)− ∗3, (A12)
where ∗3 → 0 as N →∞.
• Let X˜j,i (j = 1, 2), Q˜i, S˜i, Y˜i and Z˜i be the random vectors for block i, and let Xnj = (X˜j,1, ..., X˜j,n)
(j = 1, 2), Qn = (Q˜1, ..., Q˜n), Sn = (S˜1, ..., S˜n), Y n = (Y˜1, ..., Y˜n) and Zn = (Z˜1, ..., Z˜n). Moreover, for
given s˜1, the sub-vectors of X˜1,i, X˜2,i, Q˜i, S˜i, Y˜i and Z˜i are denoted by X˜
Ns˜1
1,i , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i , Q˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , Y˜
Ns˜1
i
and Z˜Ns˜1i , respectively. The real values of the above random vectors are denoted by lower case letters.
B. Encoding and decoding schemes
1). Codebooks construction:
• First, fix the probability PX1|S˜1,Q(x1|s˜1, q)PX2|S˜1,S˜2,Q(x2|s˜1, s˜2, q)PQ|S˜1(q|s˜1). Then, in block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n),
for a given s˜1 (1 ≤ s˜1 ≤ k), randomly produce 2Ns˜1 (R10(s˜1)+R11(s˜1)+R∗1(s˜1)+R20(s˜1)+R21(s˜1)+R∗2(s˜1)) i.i.d.
sequences q˜Ns˜1i according to PQ|S˜1(q|s˜1), and index these sequences as q˜
Ns˜1
i (w
′
0,i,s˜1
), where 1 ≤ w′0,i,s˜1 ≤
2Ns˜1 (R10(s˜1)+R11(s˜1)+R
∗
1(s˜1)+R20(s˜1)+R21(s˜1)+R
∗
2(s˜1)).
• For each q˜Ns˜1i (w
′
0,i,s˜1
), randomly produce 2Ns˜1 (R10(s˜1)+R11(s˜1)+R
∗
1(s˜1)) i.i.d. sequences x˜Ns˜11,i according to
PX1|S˜1,Q(x1|s˜1, q), and index these sequences as x˜
Ns˜1
1,i (w
′
1,i,s˜1
), where 1 ≤ w′1,i,s˜1 ≤ 2N(R10(s˜1)+R11(s˜1)+R
∗
1(s˜1)).
• For each q˜Ns˜1i (w
′
0,i,s˜1
), divide it into k sub-sequences, i.e., q˜Ns˜1i (w
′
0,i,s˜1
) = (q˜
Ns˜1,1
i (w
′
0,i,s˜1,1
), q˜
Ns˜1,2
i (w
′
0,i,s˜1,2
), ...,
q˜
Ns˜1,k
i (w
′
0,i,s˜1,k
)), where for each 1 ≤ s˜2 ≤ k, the message w′0,i,s˜1,s˜2 takes values in the set
{1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜1,s˜2 (R10(s˜1)+R11(s˜1)+R∗1(s˜1)+R20(s˜1,s˜2)+R21(s˜1,s˜2)+R∗2(s˜1,s˜2))}. For each q˜Ns˜1,s˜2i (w
′
0,i,s˜1,s˜2
), randomly
produce 2Ns˜1,s˜2 (R20(s˜1,s˜2)+R21(s˜1,s˜2)+R
∗
2(s˜1,s˜2)) i.i.d. sequences x˜Ns˜1,s˜22,i according to PX2|Q,S˜1,S˜2(x2|q, s˜1, s˜2),
and index these sequences as x˜Ns˜1,s˜22,i (w
′
2,i,s˜1,s˜2
), where 1 ≤ w′2,i,s˜1,s˜2 ≤ 2Ns˜1,s˜2 (R20(s˜1,s˜2)+R21(s˜1,s˜2)+R
∗
2(s˜1,s˜2)).
2). Encoding scheme:
• Encoding scheme for Q˜i (1 ≤ i ≤ n):
– Transmitter 1’s encoding scheme of Q˜i: In block 1 ≤ i ≤ 2d1, for each s˜1, the transmitter 1
chooses w
′
0,i,s˜1
= 1 as the index of the transmitted q˜Ns˜1i . In block i (2d1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n), for each
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s˜1, the transmitter 1 has already known the delayed state sequence s˜
Ns˜1
i−2d1 , w
′
0,i−d1,s˜1 and w
′
1,i−d1,s˜1 =
(w1,i−d1,0,s˜1 , w1,i−d1,1,s˜1 , w
∗
1,i−d1,s˜1), where s˜
Ns˜1
i−2d1 is the delayed feedback state used to de-multiplex
y˜i−d1 into the sub-sequences y˜
N1
i−d1 , ..., y˜
Nk
i−d1 . Once the transmitter 1 receives the feedback y˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , he at-
tempts to find a unique sequence x˜Ns˜12,i−d1(wˇ
′
2,i−d1,s˜1 , w
′
0,i−d1,s˜1) such that (x˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1(wˇ
′
2,i−d1,s˜1 , w
′
0,i−d1,s˜1),
x˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1(w
′
1,i−d1,s˜1 , w
′
0,i−d1,s˜1), q˜
Ns˜1
i−d1(w
′
0,i−d1,s˜1), s˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , y˜
Ns˜1
i−d1) are jointly typical sequences, where wˇ
′
2,i−d1,s˜1
= (wˇ
′
2,i−d1,s˜1,1, ..., wˇ
′
2,i−d1,s˜1,k), and wˇ
′
2,i−d1,s˜1,s˜2 (1 ≤ s˜2 ≤ k) is the transmitter 1’s estimation of
w
′
2,i−d1,s˜1,s˜2 . From the packing lemma [25], the error probability Pr{wˇ
′
2,i−d1,s˜1 6= w
′
2,i−d1,s˜1} approaches
to 0 if
R20(s˜1) +R21(s˜1) +R
∗
2(s˜1) ≤ I(X2;Y |X1, Q, S, S˜1 = s˜1). (A13)
Here note that (A13) indicates that
R20 +R21 +R
∗
2
=
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)(R20(s˜1) +R21(s˜1) +R
∗
2(s˜1))
≤
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)I(X2;Y |X1, Q, S, S˜1 = s˜1)
= I(X2;Y |X1, Q, S, S˜1) (1)= I(X2;Y |X1, Q, S, S˜1, S˜2), (A14)
where (1) follows from the Markov chains S˜2 → (X1, Q, S, S˜1)→ Y and S˜2 → (X1, Q, S, S˜1, X2)→ Y .
Thus in block i (2d1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n) and given s˜1, the transmitter 1 chooses q˜Ns˜1i with the index w
′
0,i,s˜1
=
(w
′
1,i−d1,s˜1 , wˇ
′
2,i−d1,s˜1). Finally, the transmitter 1 sends q˜i by multiplexing the different sub-codewords
q˜
Ns˜1
i .
– Transmitter 2’s encoding scheme of Q˜i: Analogously, in block 1 ≤ i ≤ 2d1 and for each s˜1, the
transmitter 2 also chooses w
′
0,i,s˜1
= 1 as the index of the transmitted q˜Ns˜1i . In block i (2d1+1 ≤ i ≤ n), for
each s˜1, the transmitter 2 has already known the delayed state sequence s˜
Ns˜1
i−2d1 , w
′
0,i−d1,s˜1 and w
′
2,i−d1,s˜1 =
(w2,i−d1,0,s˜1 , w2,i−d1,1,s˜1 , w
∗
2,i−d1,s˜1). Once the transmitter 2 receives the feedback y˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , he attempts to
find a unique sequence x˜Ns˜11,i−d1(w˜
′
1,i−d1,s˜1 , w
′
0,i−d1,s˜1) such that (x˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1(w
′
2,i−d1,s˜1 , w
′
0,i−d1,s˜1),
x˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1(w˜
′
1,i−d1,s˜1 , w
′
0,i−d1,s˜1), q˜
Ns˜1
i−d1(w
′
0,i−d1,s˜1), s˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , y˜
Ns˜1
i−d1) are jointly typical sequences, where w˜
′
1,i−d1,s˜1
is the transmitter 2’s estimation of w
′
1,i−d1,s˜1 . From the packing lemma [25], the error probability Pr{w˜
′
1,i−1,s˜1 6=
w
′
1,i−1,s˜1} approaches to 0 if
R10(s˜1) +R11(s˜1) +R
∗
1(s˜1) ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, Q, S, S˜1 = s˜1). (A15)
Here note that (A15) implies that
R10 +R11 +R
∗
1
=
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)(R10(s˜1) +R11(s˜1) +R
∗
1(s˜1))
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≤
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)I(X1;Y |X2, Q, S, S˜1 = s˜1)
= I(X1;Y |X2, Q, S, S˜1) (2)= I(X1;Y |X2, Q, S, S˜1, S˜2), (A16)
where (2) follows from the Markov chains S˜2 → (X2, Q, S, S˜1)→ Y and S˜2 → (X2, Q, S, S˜1, X1)→ Y .
Thus in block i and given s˜1, the transmitter 2 chooses q˜
Ns˜1
i with the index w
′
0,i,s˜1
= (w˜
′
1,i−d1,s˜1 , w
′
2,i−d1,s˜1).
Finally, the transmitter 2 sends q˜i by multiplexing the different sub-codewords q˜
Ns˜1
i .
• Encoding schemes for X˜1,i and X˜2,i (1 ≤ i ≤ n):
– In block 1 ≤ i ≤ 2d1 and for each s˜1, the transmitter j (j = 1, 2) chooses w′j,i,s˜1 = (wj,i,0,s˜1 , wj,i,1,s˜1 =
const, w∗j,i,s˜1) as the index of the transmitted codeword x˜
Ns˜1
j,i . The codeword x˜j,i is chosen by multiplexing
the different sub-codewords x˜Ns˜1j,i .
– In block 2d1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the transmitters have already received the delayed state sequence s˜Ns˜1i−2d1 ,
which is the delayed feedback state used to de-multiplex y˜i−d1 into the sub-sequences y˜
N1
i−d1 , ..., y˜
Nk
i−d1 .
Once the transmitters obtain the delayed channel output feedback y˜i−d1 , they first demultiplex them
into sub-sequences y˜N1i−d1 , y˜
N2
i−d1 ,..., y˜
Nk
i−d1 . Then, for the sub-sequence y˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , produce a mapping gi,s˜1 :
y˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 → {1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜1 (R11(s˜1)+R21(s˜1))}. Furthermore, define K∗i,s˜1 = (K∗1,i,s˜1 ,K∗2,i,s˜1) = gi,s˜1(Y˜
Ns˜1
i−d1)
as a random variable uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜1 (R11(s˜1)+R21(s˜1))}, and it is independent
of X˜Ns˜11,i , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , Y˜
Ns˜1
i , Z˜
Ns˜1
i , W1,i, W2,i, W
∗
1,i and W
∗
2,i. Here note that K
∗
j,i,s˜1
(j = 1, 2) is
used as a secret key of the i-th block shared by the transmitter j and the legal receiver, and k∗j,i,s˜1 ∈
{1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜1Rj1(s˜1)} is a specific value of K∗j,i,s˜1 . Moreover, note that k∗2,i,s˜1 can be further divided by
the delayed state s˜2, i.e., k∗2,i,s˜1 = (k
∗
2,i,s˜1,1
, ..., k∗2,i,s˜1,k), where k
∗
2,i,s˜1,s˜2
(1 ≤ s˜2 ≤ k) takes values in
{1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜1,s˜2R21(s˜1,s˜2)}.
Reveal the mapping gi,s˜1 to the transmitters, legal receiver and the eavesdropper. After the generation of
the secret key, the transmitter 1 chooses x˜Ns˜11,i with the index w
′
1,i,s˜1
= (w1,i,0,s˜1 , w1,i,1,s˜1⊕k∗1,i,s˜1 , w∗1,i,s˜1).
The codeword x˜1,i is chosen by multiplexing the different sub-codewords x˜
Ns˜1
1,i .
Similarly, for given s˜1 and s˜2, the transmitter 2 chooses x˜
Ns˜1,s˜2
2,i with the index w
′
2,i,s˜1,s˜2
= (w2,i,0,s˜1,s˜2 ,
w2,i,1,s˜1,s˜2⊕k∗2,i,s˜1,s˜2 , w∗2,i,s˜1,s˜2). The codeword x˜2,i is chosen by multiplexing the different sub-codewords
x˜
Ns˜1,s˜2
1,i .
3). Decoding scheme: Once the legal receiver receives all n blocks yn = (y˜1, ..., y˜n) and sn = (s˜1, ..., s˜n),
first, he demultiplexes them into sub-sequences y˜N11 , y˜
N2
1 ,..., y˜
Nk
1 ,...,y˜
N1
n ,...,y˜
Nk
n , s˜
N1
1 , s˜
N2
1 ,..., s˜
Nk
1 ,...,s˜
N1
n ,...,s˜
Nk
n .
Then, since the legal receiver also knows the secret key produced by the delayed channel output feedback, he
does backward decoding which is exactly the same as that of the classical MAC with noiseless feedback, see [23].
Following similar steps of error probability analysis for MAC with noiseless feedback (see [23, pp. 295-296]), we
can conclude that the legal receiver can decode the transmitted messages and the dummy messages with decoding
error probability less than any  > 0 if
R10 +R11 +R
∗
1 +R20 +R21 +R
∗
2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1)
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(a)
= H(Y |S, S˜1, S˜2)−H(Y |X1, X2, S, S˜1, S˜2)
= I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2), (A17)
where (a) is from the Markov chains S˜2 → (S, S˜1)→ Y and S˜2 → (X1, X2, S, S˜1)→ Y .
C. Equivocation analysis
First, we give a lower bound on H(K∗i,s˜1 |X˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , S˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , Z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , S˜1 = s˜1), which will be used in the
analysis of the eavesdropper’s equivocation about the transmitted messages W1 and W2.
In block i− d1 (2d1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n) and for a given S˜1 = s˜1, suppose that the eavesdropper knows not only S˜Ns˜1i−d1
and Z˜Ns˜1i−d1 , but also X˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , the eavesdropper’s equivocation about the secret key K
∗
i,s˜1
can be bounded
by Ahlswede and Cai’s balanced coloring lemma [21, p. 260], see the followings.
Lemma 1: (Balanced coloring lemma) Given S˜1 = s˜1, for arbitrary , δ > 0, sufficiently large Ns˜1 , all Ns˜1 -
type PX1X2SS˜1Y (x1, x2, s, s˜1, y) and all x˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , x˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d2 , s˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 ∈ T
Ns˜1
X1X2S|S˜1(s˜1) (where 2d1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n), there
exists a γ-coloring c : TNs˜1
Y |X1,X2,S,S˜1(x˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , x˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , s˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , s˜1) → {1, 2, .., γ} such that for all joint Ns˜1 -type
PX1X2SS˜1Y Z(x1, x2, s, s˜1, y, z) with marginal distribution PX1X2SS˜1Z(x1, x2, s, s˜1, z),
|TNs˜1
Y |X1,X2,S,S˜1,Z(x˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , x˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , s˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , s˜1)|
γ
≥ 2Ns˜1 ,
and x˜Ns˜11,i−d1 , x˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , s˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 ∈ T
Ns˜1
X1X2SZ|S˜1 ,
|c−1(k)| ≤
|TNs˜1
Y |X1,X2,S,S˜1,Z(x˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , x˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , s˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , s˜1)|(1 + δ)
γ
, (A18)
for k = 1, 2, ..., γ, where c−1 is the inverse image of c.
From Lemma 1, we see that the typical set TNs˜1
Y |X1,X2,S,S˜1,Z(x˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , x˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , s˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , s˜1) maps into at least
|TNs˜1
Y |X1,X2,S,S˜1,Z(x˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , x˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , s˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , s˜1)|
|TNs˜1
Y |X1,X2,S,S˜1,Z
(x˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 ,x˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 ,s˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 ,z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 ,s˜1)|(1+δ)
γ
=
γ
1 + δ
(A19)
colors. On the other hand, the typical set TNs˜1
Y |X1,X2,S,S˜1,Z(x˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , x˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , s˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , s˜1) maps into at most γ
colors. From (A19), we can conclude that
H(K∗i,s˜1 |X˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , S˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , Z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , S˜1 = s˜1) ≥ log
γ
1 + δ
. (A20)
Here note that
|TNs˜1
Y |X1,X2,S,S˜1,Z(x˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , x˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , s˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , s˜1)|
γ
≥ 2Ns˜1
implies that
γ ≤ |TNs˜1
Y |X1,X2,S,S˜1,Z(x˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , x˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , s˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , s˜1)|.
Choosing γ = |TNs˜1
Y |X1,X2,S,S˜1,Z(x˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , x˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , s˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , s˜1)| and noticing that
|TNs˜1
Y |X1,X2,S,S˜1,Z(x˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , x˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , s˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , s˜1)|
≥ (1− 1)2Ns˜1 (1−2)H(Y |X1,X2,S,Z,S˜1=s˜1), (A21)
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where 1 and 2 tend to 0 as N tends to infinity, (A20) can be further bounded by
H(K∗i,s˜1 |X˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , S˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , Z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , S˜1 = s˜1)
≥ log 1− 1
1 + δ
+Ns˜1(1− 2)H(Y |X1, X2, S, Z, S˜1 = s˜1). (A22)
Now we show the bound on the eavesdropper’s equivocation ∆ to the transmitted messages, see the followings.
The overall equivocation ∆, which is denoted by ∆ = 1nNH(W1,W2|Zn, Sn), can be expressed as
∆ =
1
nN
H(W1,W2|Zn, Sn)
=
1
nN
n∑
i=1
H(W1,i,W2,i|Zn, Sn,W1,1,W2,1, ...,W1,i−1,W2,i−1)
=
1
nN
n∑
i=1
H(W1,i,0,W1,i,1,W2,i,0,W2,i,1|Zn, Sn,W1,1,W2,1, ...,W1,i−1,W2,i−1)
=
1
nN
n∑
i=1
(H(W1,i,0,W2,i,0|Zn, Sn,W1,1,W2,1, ...,W1,i−1,W2,i−1)
+H(W1,i,1,W2,i,1|Zn, Sn,W1,1,W2,1, ...,W1,i−1,W2,i−1,W1,i,0,W2,i,0))
(a)
=
1
nN
n∑
i=1
H(W1,i,0,W2,i,0|Zn, Sn,W1,1,W2,1, ...,W1,i−1,W2,i−1)
+
1
nN
n∑
i=2d1+1
H(W1,i,1,W2,i,1|Zn, Sn,W1,1,W2,1, ...,W1,i−1,W2,i−1,W1,i,0,W2,i,0), (A23)
where (a) is from the fact that W1,i,1 and W2,i,1 are constants when 1 ≤ i ≤ 2d1.
The first conditional entropy H(W1,i,0,W2,i,0|Zn, Sn,W1,1,W2,1, ...,W1,i−1,W2,i−1) of (A23) is bounded by
H(W1,i,0,W2,i,0|Zn, Sn,W1,1,W2,1, ...,W1,i−1,W2,i−1)
=
k∑
s˜1=1
H(W1,i,0,s˜1 ,W2,i,0,s˜1 |W1,i,0,1,W2,i,0,1, ...,W1,i,0,s˜1−1,W2,i,0,s˜1−1, Zn, Sn,W1,1,W2,1, ...,W1,i−1,W2,i−1)
≥
k∑
s˜1=1
H(W1,i,0,s˜1 ,W2,i,0,s˜1 |W1,i,0,1,W2,i,0,1, ...,W1,i,0,s˜1−1,W2,i,0,s˜1−1, Zn, Sn,W1,1,W2,1, ...,W1,i−1,W2,i−1,
S˜1 = s˜1)
(b)
=
k∑
s˜1=1
H(W1,i,0,s˜1 ,W2,i,0,s˜1 |Z˜Ns˜1i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜1 = s˜1)
=
k∑
s˜1=1
(H(W1,i,0,s˜1 ,W2,i,0,s˜1 , Z˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜1 = s˜1)−H(Z˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜1 = s˜1))
=
k∑
s˜1=1
(H(X˜
Ns˜1
1,i , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i ,W1,i,0,s˜1 ,W2,i,0,s˜1 , Z˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜1 = s˜1)
−H(X˜Ns˜11,i , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i |W1,i,0,s˜1 ,W2,i,0,s˜1 , Z˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜1 = s˜1)−H(Z˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜1 = s˜1))
(c)
=
k∑
s˜1=1
(H(Z˜
Ns˜1
i |X˜
Ns˜1
1,i , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜1 = s˜1) +H(X˜
Ns˜1
1,i , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i |S˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜1 = s˜1)
−H(X˜Ns˜11,i , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i |W1,i,0,s˜1 ,W2,i,0,s˜1 , Z˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜1 = s˜1)−H(Z˜
Ns˜1
i |S˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜1 = s˜1))
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(d)
=
k∑
s˜1=1
(H(Z˜
Ns˜1
i |X˜
Ns˜1
1,i , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜1 = s˜1) +H(X˜
Ns˜1
1,i |S˜1 = s˜1) +H(X˜
Ns˜1
2,i |S˜1 = s˜1)
−H(X˜Ns˜11,i , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i |W1,i,0,s˜1 ,W2,i,0,s˜1 , Z˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜1 = s˜1)−H(Z˜
Ns˜1
i |S˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜1 = s˜1))
(e)
≥
k∑
s˜1=1
(H(X˜
Ns˜1
1,i |S˜1 = s˜1) +H(X˜
Ns˜1
2,i |S˜1 = s˜1)
−H(X˜Ns˜11,i , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i |W1,i,0,s˜1 ,W2,i,0,s˜1 , Z˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜1 = s˜1)−Ns˜1I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1 = s˜1))
(f)
=
k∑
s˜1=1
(Ns˜1(R10(s˜1) +R11(s˜1) +R
∗
1(s˜1)) +Ns˜1(R20(s˜1) +R21(s˜1) +R
∗
2(s˜1))
−H(X˜Ns˜11,i , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i |W1,i,0,s˜1 ,W2,i,0,s˜1 , Z˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜1 = s˜1)−Ns˜1I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1 = s˜1))
(g)
≥
k∑
s˜1=1
(Ns˜1(R10(s˜1) +R11(s˜1) +R
∗
1(s˜1)) +Ns˜1(R20(s˜1) +R21(s˜1) +R
∗
2(s˜1))
−Ns˜13 −Ns˜1I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1 = s˜1)), (A24)
where (b) follows from the Markov chain (W1,i,0,1,W2,i,0,1, ...,W1,i,0,s˜1−1,W2,i,0,s˜1−1,W1,1,W2,1, ...,W1,i−1,
W2,i−1, Z˜N1i , S˜
N1
i , ..., Z˜
Ns˜1−1
i , S˜
Ns˜1−1
i , Z˜
Ns˜1+1
i , S˜
Ns˜1+1
i ..., Z˜
Nk
i , S˜
Nk
i , Z˜1, S˜1, ..., Z˜i−1, S˜i−1, Z˜i+1, S˜i+1, ..., Z˜n, S˜n)→
(Z˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜1 = s˜1)→ (W1,i,0,s˜1 ,W2,i,0,s˜1), (c) follows from the fact that H(W1,i,0,s˜1 ,W2,i,0,s˜1 |X˜
Ns˜1
1,i , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i ) =
0, (d) follows from the fact that given S˜1 = s˜1, X˜
Ns˜1
1,i is independent of S˜
Ns˜1
i and X˜
Ns˜1
2,i , and given S˜1 = s˜1,
X˜
Ns˜1
2,i is independent of S˜
Ns˜1
i , (e) follows from the construction of the codebooks and the fact that the channel is
memoryless, (f) follows from the fact that given S˜1 = s˜1, there are 2Ns˜1 (R10(s˜1)+R11(s˜1)+R
∗
1(s˜1)) codewords X˜Ns˜11,i ,
and there are 2Ns˜1 (R20(s˜1)+R21(s˜1)+R
∗
2(s˜1)) codewords X˜Ns˜12,i , and (g) follows from the fact that given W1,i,0,s˜1 ,
W2,i,0,s˜1 , Z˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜
Ns˜1
i and S˜1 = s˜1, the eavesdropper’s decoding error probability of X˜
Ns˜1
1,i and X˜
Ns˜1
2,i tends to 0 if
R11(s˜1) +R
∗
1(s˜1) +R21(s˜1) +R
∗
2(s˜1) ≤ I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1 = s˜1), (A25)
then by using Fano’s inequality, we have 1Ns˜1H(X˜
Ns˜1
1,i , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i |W1,i,0,s˜1 ,W2,i,0,s˜1 , Z˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , S˜1 = s˜1) ≤ 3, where
3 → 0 as Ns˜1 →∞. Here note that (A25) implies that
R11 +R
∗
1 +R21 +R
∗
2
=
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)(R11(s˜1) +R
∗
1(s˜1) +R21(s˜1) +R
∗
2(s˜1))
≤
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1 = s˜1)
= I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1) (1)= I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2), (A26)
where (1) follows from the Markov chains S˜2 → (S, S˜1)→ Z and S˜2 → (S, S˜1, X1, X2)→ Z.
For 2d1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the second conditional entropy H(W1,i,1,W2,i,1|Zn, Sn,W1,1,W2,1, ...,W1,i−1,W2,i−1,
W1,i,0,W2,i,0) of (A23) is bounded by
H(W1,i,1,W2,i,1|Zn, Sn,W1,1,W2,1, ...,W1,i−1,W2,i−1,W1,i,0,W2,i,0)
≥ H(W1,i,1,W2,i,1|Zn, Sn,W1,1,W2,1, ...,W1,i−1,W2,i−1,W1,i,0,W2,i,0, Xn1 , Xn2 )
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(h)
= H(W1,i,1,W2,i,1|Z˜i, S˜i, X˜1,i, X˜2,i, Z˜i−d1 , S˜i−d1 , X˜1,i−d1 , X˜2,i−d1)
=
k∑
s˜1=1
H(W1,i,1,s˜1 ,W2,i,1,s˜1 |W1,i,1,1,W2,i,1,1, ...,W1,i,1,s˜1−1,W2,i,1,s˜1−1,
Z˜i, S˜i, X˜1,i, X˜2,i, Z˜i−d1 , S˜i−d1 , X˜1,i−d1 , X˜2,i−d1)
≥
k∑
s˜1=1
H(W1,i,1,s˜1 ,W2,i,1,s˜1 |W1,i,1,1,W2,i,1,1, ...,W1,i,1,s˜1−1,W2,i,1,s˜1−1,
Z˜i, S˜i, X˜1,i, X˜2,i, Z˜i−d1 , S˜i−d1 , X˜1,i−d1 , X˜2,i−d1 , S˜1 = s˜1)
(i)
=
k∑
s˜1=1
H(W1,i,1,s˜1 ,W2,i,1,s˜1 |Z˜Ns˜1i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , X˜
Ns˜1
1,i , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i , Z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , S˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , X˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , S˜1 = s˜1)
≥
k∑
s˜1=1
H(W1,i,1,s˜1 ,W2,i,1,s˜1 |Z˜Ns˜1i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , X˜
Ns˜1
1,i , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i , Z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , S˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , X˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , S˜1 = s˜1,
W1,i,1,s˜1 ⊕K∗1,i,s˜1 ,W2,i,1,s˜1 ⊕K∗2,i,s˜1)
(j)
=
k∑
s˜1=1
H(W1,i,1,s˜1 ,W2,i,1,s˜1 |Z˜Ns˜1i−d1 , S˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , X˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , S˜1 = s˜1,W1,i,1,s˜1 ⊕K∗1,i,s˜1 ,W2,i,1,s˜1 ⊕K∗2,i,s˜1)
=
k∑
s˜1=1
H(K∗1,i,s˜1 ,K
∗
2,i,s˜1 |Z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , S˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , X˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , S˜1 = s˜1,W1,i,1,s˜1 ⊕K∗1,i,s˜1 ,W2,i,1,s˜1 ⊕K∗2,i,s˜1)
(k)
=
k∑
s˜1=1
H(K∗1,i,s˜1 ,K
∗
2,i,s˜1 |Z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , S˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , X˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , S˜1 = s˜1)
(l)
≥
k∑
s˜1=1
(log
1− 1
1 + δ
+Ns˜1(1− 2)H(Y |X1, X2, S, Z, S˜1 = s˜1)), (A27)
where (h) follows from the fact that given the random vectors of the i-th block and the i − d1-th block, the
messages W1,i,1 and W2,i,1 are independent of the random vectors of the other blocks, and from the fact that
H(W1,i,0,W2,i,0|X˜1,i, X˜2,i) = 0, (i) follows from the fact that given the s˜1-th part of the random vectors Z˜i, S˜i,
X˜1,i, X˜2,i, Z˜i−d1 , S˜i−d1 , X˜1,i−d1 , X˜2,i−d1 , the messages W1,i,1,s˜1 and W2,i,1,s˜1 are independent of the other parts
of these random vectors, (j) follows from the Markov chain (Z˜Ns˜1i , S˜
Ns˜1
i , X˜
Ns˜1
1,i , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i )→ (Z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , S˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , X˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 ,
X˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , S˜1 = s˜1,W1,i,1,s˜1 ⊕ K∗1,i,s˜1 ,W2,i,1,s˜1 ⊕ K∗2,i,s˜1) → (W1,i,1,s˜1 ,W2,i,1,s˜1), (k) follows from the Markov
chain (W1,i,1,s˜1 ⊕K∗1,i,s˜1 ,W2,i,1,s˜1 ⊕K∗2,i,s˜1) → (Z˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , S˜
Ns˜1
i−d1 , X˜
Ns˜1
1,i−d1 , X˜
Ns˜1
2,i−d1 , S˜1 = s˜1) → (K∗1,i,s˜1 ,K∗2,i,s˜1),
and (l) follows from (A22).
Substituting (A24) and (A27) into (A23), the equivocation ∆ is lower bounded by
∆ ≥ 1
nN
n∑
i=1
k∑
s˜1=1
(Ns˜1(R10(s˜1) +R11(s˜1) +R
∗
1(s˜1)) +Ns˜1(R20(s˜1) +R21(s˜1) +R
∗
2(s˜1))
−Ns˜13 −Ns˜1I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1 = s˜1)) +
1
nN
n∑
i=2d1+1
k∑
s˜1=1
(log
1− 1
1 + δ
+Ns˜1(1− 2)H(Y |X1, X2, S, Z, S˜1 = s˜1))
(m)
= R10 +R11 +R
∗
1 +R20 +R21 +R
∗
2 − 3 − I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1)
−1
∑k
s˜1=1
(R10(s˜1) +R11(s˜1) +R
∗
1(s˜1) +R20(s˜1) +R21(s˜1) +R
∗
2(s˜1)− 3 − I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1 = s˜1))
N
+
n− 2d1
nN
k log
1− 1
1 + δ
+
n− 2d1
n
(1− 2)H(Y |X1, X2, S, Z, S˜1)
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−n− 2d1
nN
1(1− 2)
k∑
s˜1=1
H(Y |X1, X2, S, Z, S˜1 = s˜1), (A28)
where (m) follows from the definitions in (A1) and (A2). The lower bound (A28) implies that if we choose
sufficiently large N and n, we have
∆ ≥ R10 +R11 +R∗1 +R20 +R21 +R∗2 − I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1) +H(Y |X1, X2, S, Z, S˜1)− 
(n)
= R10 +R11 +R
∗
1 +R20 +R21 +R
∗
2 − I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2) +H(Y |X1, X2, S, Z, S˜1, S˜2)− ,
(A29)
where (n) follows from the Markov chains S˜2 → (S, S˜1) → Z, S˜2 → (X1, X2, S, S˜1) → Z and S˜2 →
(X1, X2, S, S˜1, Z)→ Y . From (A29), we see that ∆ ≥ R10 +R11 +R20 +R21 −  is achieved if
R∗1 +R
∗
2 ≥ I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2)−H(Y |X1, X2, S, Z, S˜1, S˜2). (A30)
Finally, combining (A14), (A16), (A17) and (A26) with (A30), and applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination (see, e.g.,
[28]) to eliminate R∗1, R
∗
2, R10, R11, R20 and R21 (here note that R1 = R10+R11 and R2 = R20+R21), Theorem
1 is obtained.
The proof of Theorem 1 is completed.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The bounds on the cardinality of the auxiliary random variables U , V1 and V2 are directly from the support
lemma [25, pp. 633-634], and thus we omit the proof here. Theorem 2 is proved by showing that for any achievable
secrecy rate pair (R1, R2), the inequalities R1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2), R2 ≤ I(V2;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2) and R1 +R2 ≤
min{H(Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2, Z), I(V1, V2;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)} hold. Here the random variables U , V1, V2, S, S˜1, S˜2, Y and
Z are denoted by
U , (Y J−1, ZNJ+1, SN , J), V1 , (U,W1), V2 , (U,W2), Y , YJ , Z , ZJ
S , SJ , S˜1 , SJ−d1 , S˜2 , SJ−d2 , (A31)
where the uniformly distributed random variable J takes values in the set {1, 2, , ..., N}, and it is independent of
Y N , ZN , W1, W2 and SN .
Proof of R1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2):
First, note that the joint secrecy ensures the individual secrecy, and thus we have
R1 −  ≤ 1
N
H(W1|ZN , SN )
=
1
N
(H(W1)− I(W1;ZN , SN )) (a)= 1
N
(H(W1)− I(W1;ZN |SN ))
(b)
=
1
N
(H(W1|SN )−H(W1|Y N , SN ) +H(W1|Y N , SN )− I(W1;ZN |SN ))
(c)
≤ 1
N
(I(W1;Y
N |SN ) + δ(Pe)− I(W1;ZN |SN ))
25
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1;Yi|Y i−1, SN )− I(W1;Zi|ZNi+1, SN )) +
δ(Pe)
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1;Yi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1)− I(W1;Zi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1) + I(Yi;ZNi+1|Y i−1, SN )
−I(Zi;Y i−1|ZNi+1, SN )− I(Yi;ZNi+1|W1, Y i−1, SN ) + I(Zi;Y i−1|W1, ZNi+1, SN )) +
δ(Pe)
N
(d)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1;Yi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1)− I(W1;Zi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(e)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1;Yi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)
−I(W1;Zi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(f)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(V1,i;Yi|Ui, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)− I(V1,i;Zi|Ui, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)) +
δ(Pe)
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
I(V1,i;Yi|Ui, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2) +
δ(Pe)
N
(g)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(V1,i;Yi|Ui, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2 , J = i) +
δ(Pe)
N
= I(V1,J ;YJ |UJ , SJ , SJ−d1 , SJ−d2 , J) +
δ(Pe)
N
(h)
= I(V1;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2) + δ(Pe)
N
(i)
≤ I(V1;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2) + δ()
N
, (A32)
where (a) and (b) are deduced from W1 is independent of SN , (c) is deduced from Fano’s inequality, (d) is deduced
from Csisza´r’s equality [3], i.e.,
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|Y i−1, SN ) = I(Zi;Y i−1|ZNi+1, SN ), (A33)
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|W1, Y i−1, SN ) = I(Zi;Y i−1|W1, ZNi+1, SN ), (A34)
(e) is deduced from Si, Si−d1 and Si−d2 are included in S
N , hence we have H(Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2 |SN ) = 0, and
here note that Si−d1 = const (or Si−d2 = const) when i ≤ d1 (or i ≤ d2), (f) is deduced from the definitions
Ui = (Y
i−1, SN , ZNi+1) and V1,i = (W1, Y
i−1, SN , ZNi+1), (g) is deduced from J is a uniformly distributed random
variable which takes values in the set {1, 2, ..., N}, and it is independent of Y N , ZN , W1, W2 and SN , (h) is
from the definitions in (A39), and (i) follows from the fact that δ(Pe) is a monotonic increasing function of Pe
and Pe ≤ . Then, letting → 0, the bound R1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2) is obtained.
Proof of R1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2):
The proof of R2 ≤ I(V2;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2) is analogous to the proof of R1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2), and thus we
omit the proof here.
Proof of R1 +R2 ≤ min{H(Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2, Z), I(V1, V2;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)}:
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From (2.11), we know that
R1 +R2 −  ≤ 1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN , SN )
=
1
N
(H(W1,W2)− I(W1,W2;ZN , SN )) (a)= 1
N
(H(W1,W2)− I(W1,W2;ZN |SN ))
(b)
=
1
N
(H(W1,W2|SN )−H(W1,W2|Y N , SN ) +H(W1,W2|Y N , SN )− I(W1,W2;ZN |SN ))
(c)
≤ 1
N
(I(W1,W2;Y
N |SN ) + δ(Pe)− I(W1,W2;ZN |SN ))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1,W2;Yi|Y i−1, SN )− I(W1,W2;Zi|ZNi+1, SN )) +
δ(Pe)
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1,W2;Yi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1)− I(W1,W2;Zi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1)
+I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|Y i−1, SN )− I(Zi;Y i−1|ZNi+1, SN )
−I(Yi;ZNi+1|W1,W2, Y i−1, SN ) + I(Zi;Y i−1|W1,W2, ZNi+1, SN )) +
δ(Pe)
N
(d)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1,W2;Yi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1)− I(W1,W2;Zi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(e)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1,W2;Yi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)
−I(W1,W2;Zi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(f)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(V1,i, V2,i;Yi|Ui, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)− I(V1,i, V2,i;Zi|Ui, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)) +
δ(Pe)
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
I(V1,i, V2,i;Yi|Ui, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2) +
δ(Pe)
N
(g)
= I(V1,J , V2,J ;YJ |UJ , SJ , SJ−d1 , SJ−d2 , J) +
δ(Pe)
N
(h)
= I(V1, V2;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2) + δ(Pe)
N
(i)
≤ I(V1, V2;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2) + δ()
N
, (A35)
where (a) and (b) are deduced from SN is independent of W1 and W2, (c) is deduced from Fano’s inequality, (d)
is deduced from Csisza´r’s equality [3], i.e.,
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|Y i−1, SN ) = I(Zi;Y i−1|ZNi+1, SN ), (A36)
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|W1,W2, Y i−1, SN ) = I(Zi;Y i−1|W1,W2, ZNi+1, SN ), (A37)
(e) is deduced from Si, Si−d1 and Si−d2 are included in S
N , (f) is deduced from the definitions Ui = (Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1),
V1,i = (W1, Y
i−1, SN , ZNi+1) and V2,i = (W2, Y
i−1, SN , ZNi+1), (g) is deduced from J is a uniformly distributed
random variable which takes values in {1, 2, ..., N}, and it is independent of Y N , ZN , W1, W2 and SN , (h) is
from the definitions in (A39), and (i) follows from the fact that δ(Pe) is a monotonic increasing function of Pe
and Pe ≤ . Then, letting → 0, the bound R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1, V2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2, U) is obtained.
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Moreover, note that
R1 +R2 −  ≤ 1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN , SN )
=
1
N
(H(W1,W2|ZN , SN )−H(W1,W2|ZN , SN , Y N ) +H(W1,W2|ZN , SN , Y N ))
=
1
N
(I(W1,W2;Y
N |ZN , SN ) +H(W1,W2|ZN , SN , Y N ))
(1)
≤ 1
N
H(Y N |ZN , SN ) + δ(Pe)
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
H(Yi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, Zi, Zi−1, SN ) +
δ(Pe)
N
(2)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
H(Yi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, Zi, Zi−1, SN , Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2) +
δ(Pe)
N
(3)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
H(Yi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, Zi, SN , Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2) +
δ()
N
(4)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
H(Yi|Ui, Zi, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2 , J = i) +
δ()
N
(5)
= H(YJ |UJ , ZJ , SJ , SJ−d1 , SJ−d2 , J) +
δ()
N
(6)
= H(Y |U,Z, S, S˜1, S˜2) + δ()
N
, (A38)
where (1) is deduced from Fano’s inequality, (2) is deduced from Si, Si−d1 and Si−d2 are included in S
N , hence
we have H(Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2 |SN ) = 0, and here note that Si−d1 = const (or Si−d2 = const) when i ≤ d1
(or i ≤ d2), (3) is deduced from δ(Pe) is a monotonic increasing function of Pe and Pe ≤ , (4) and (5) are
deduced from the definitions Ui = (Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1) and J is a uniformly distributed random variable which takes
values in the set {1, 2, ..., N}, and it is independent of Y N , ZN , W1, W2 and SN , and (6) is deduced from the
definitions in (A39). Letting  → 0, the bound R1 + R2 ≤ H(Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2, Z) is obtained. Thus the proof of
R1 +R2 ≤ min{H(Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2, Z), I(V1, V2;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)} and the proof of Theorem 2 are completed.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
To prove Theorem 3, we first show that the region R∗
R∗ = {(R1, R2) : 0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(X1;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2),
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1, S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2),
0 ≤ R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2)}
is achievable. Then using a standard time sharing technique [17, p.3438], Theorem 3 is directly obtained. Now the
remainder of this section is organized as follows. Some basic definitions used in the code construction are introduced
in Subsection C-A, the encoding and decoding schemes are shown in Subsection C-B, and the equivocation analysis
is given in Subsection C-C.
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A. Basic definitions
• Without loss of generality, denote the state alphabet S by S = {1, 2, ..., k}, and note that the steady state
probability pi(l) > 0 for all l ∈ S. In addition, denote Ns˜1 (1 ≤ s˜1 ≤ k) by
Ns˜1 = NPS˜1(s˜1)− 1, (A1)
and Ns˜1,s˜2 (1 ≤ s˜1, s˜2 ≤ k) by
Ns˜1,s˜2 = NPS˜1S˜2(s˜1, s˜2)−
1
k
, (A2)
where 1 > 0 and 1 → 0 as N →∞. Here note that from (A1) and (A2), we have
k∑
s˜2=1
Ns˜1,s˜2 = Ns˜1 . (A3)
• Let W ∗1 and W
∗
2 be the dummy messages taking values in {1, 2, ..., 2NR
∗
1} and {1, 2, ..., 2NR∗2}, respectively.
In addition, let R1(s˜1), R2(s˜1, s˜2), R∗1(s˜1) and R
∗
2(s˜1, s˜2) be the transmission rates R1, R2, R
∗
1 and R
∗
2 for
given s˜1 and s˜2, respectively, and they satisfy
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)R1(s˜1) = R1, (A4)
k∑
s˜1=1
k∑
s˜2=1
PS˜1S˜2(s˜1, s˜2)R2(s˜1, s˜2) = R2, (A5)
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)R
∗
1(s˜1) = R
∗
1, (A6)
k∑
s˜1=1
k∑
s˜2=1
PS˜1S˜2(s˜1, s˜2)R
∗
2(s˜1, s˜2) = R
∗
2. (A7)
• The messages W1 and W ∗1 are respectively denoted by W1 = (W1,1, ...,W1,k) and W
∗
1 = (W
∗
1,1, ...,W
∗
1,k),
where the sub-messages W1,s˜1 and W
∗
1,s˜1
(s˜1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}) take values in the setsW1,s˜1 = {1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜1R1(s˜1)}
andW∗1,s˜1 = {1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜1R
∗
1(s˜1)}, respectively. Similarly, denote W2 and W ∗2 by W2 = (W2,1,1,W2,1,2, ...,W2,k,k)
and W ∗2 = (W
∗
2,1,1,W
∗
2,1,2, ...,W
∗
2,k,k), respectively, and the sub-messages W2,s˜1,s˜2 and W
∗
2,s˜1,s˜2
(s˜1 ∈
{1, 2, ..., k} and s˜2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}) respectively take values in the sets W2,s˜1,s˜2 = {1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜1,s˜2R2(s˜1,s˜2)}
and W∗2,s˜1,s˜2 = {1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜1,s˜2R
∗
2(s˜1,s˜2)}.
B. Encoding and decoding schemes
1). Codebooks construction: Fix the probabilities PX1|S˜1(x1|s˜1) and PX2|S˜1,S˜2(x2|s˜1, s˜2), and then the construc-
tion of the code-book is as follows.
• Codebook construction of XN1 : Generating k sub-codebooks C s˜11 of XN1 for all s˜1 ∈ S. In each sub-codebook
C s˜11 , randomly generate 2Ns˜1 (R1(s˜1)+R
∗
1(s˜1)) i.i.d. codewords xNs˜1 according to PX1|S˜1(x1|s˜1), and index these
codewords as xNs˜11 (i), where 1 ≤ i ≤ 2Ns˜1 (R1(s˜1)+R
∗
1(s˜1)). Here for a fixed block length N , we define Ls˜1 as
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the number of times during the N symbols for which the delayed state at the transmitter 1 is S˜1 = s˜1. Every
time that the transmitter 1 receives a delayed state S˜1 = s˜1, he chooses the next symbol from the sub-codebook
C s˜11 . Since Ls˜1 is not necessarily equal to Ns˜1 , an error occurs if Ls˜1 < Ns˜1 , and the code is filled with zero
if Ls˜1 > Ns˜1 . Here note that the state process is stationary and ergodic, thus we have
lim
N→∞
Ls˜1
N
= Pr{S˜1 = s˜1}. (A8)
Combining (A8) with (A1), we know that
Pr{Ls˜1 < Ns˜1} → 0, as N →∞. (A9)
• Codebook construction of XN2 : Generating k×k sub-codebooks C s˜1,s˜22 of XN2 for all s˜1 ∈ S and s˜2 ∈ S. In
each sub-codebook C s˜1,s˜22 , randomly generate 2Ns˜1,s˜2 (R2(s˜1,s˜2)+R
∗
2(s˜1,s˜2)) i.i.d. codewords xNs˜1,s˜22 according
to PX2|S˜1,S˜2(x2|s˜1, s˜2). Index the codewords of the sub-codebook C
s˜1,s˜2
2 as x
Ns˜1,s˜2
2 (j), where 1 ≤ j ≤
2Ns˜1,s˜2 (R2(s˜1,s˜2)+R
∗
2(s˜1,s˜2)). For a fixed block length N , we define Ls˜1,s˜2 as the number of times during the N
symbols for which the delayed state at the transmitter 2 is (S˜1, S˜2) = (s˜1, s˜2). Every time that the transmitter
2 receives the delayed state (S˜1, S˜2) = (s˜1, s˜2), he chooses the next symbol from the sub-codebook C s˜1,s˜22 .
Since Ls˜1,s˜2 is not necessarily equal to Ns˜1,s˜2 , an error occurs if Ls˜1,s˜2 < Ns˜1,s˜2 , and the code is filled with
zero if Ls˜1,s˜2 > Ns˜1,s˜2 . Here note that
lim
N→∞
Ls˜1,s˜2
N
= Pr{S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2 = s˜2}. (A10)
Combining (A10) with (A2), we know that
Pr{Ls˜1,s˜2 < Ns˜1,s˜2} → 0, as N →∞. (A11)
2). Encoding scheme: For the transmitter 1, suppose that a message w1 = (w1,1, ..., w1,k) and a randomly
generated dummy message w∗1 = (w
∗
1,1, ..., w
∗
1,k) are chosen to be transmitted. In each sub-codebook C s˜11 (1 ≤
s˜1 ≤ k), the transmitter 1 chooses xNs˜11 (w1,s˜1 , w∗1,s˜1) as the s˜1-th component codeword of the transmitted xN1 . The
transmitted codeword xN1 is obtained by multiplexing the different component codewords chosen in the different
sub-codebooks.
Similarly, for the transmitter 2, suppose that a message w2 = (w2,1,1, w2,1,2, ..., w2,k,k) and a randomly generated
dummy message w∗2 = (w
∗
2,1,1, w
∗
2,1,2, ..., w
∗
2,k,k) are chosen to be transmitted. In each sub-codebook C s˜1,s˜22 (1 ≤
s˜1, s˜2 ≤ k), the transmitter 2 chooses xNs˜1,s˜22 (w2,s˜1,s˜2 , w∗2,s˜1,s˜2) as the (s˜1, s˜2)-th component codeword of the
transmitted xN2 . The transmitted codeword x
N
2 is obtained by multiplexing the different component codewords
chosen in the different sub-codebooks.
3). Decoding scheme for the legitimate receiver: Since the legitimate receiver knows the delayed feedback state
S˜1, he uses it to demultiplex his received channel output yN and the state sequence sN into outputs with respect
to the sub-codebooks of the transmitters. From (A3), we know that for each s˜1 (1 ≤ s˜1), xNs˜12 (w2,s˜1 , w∗2,s˜1) can
be re-written as xNs˜12 (w2,s˜1 , w
∗
2,s˜1
) = (x
Ns˜1,1
2 (w2,s˜1,1, w
∗
2,s˜1,1
), x
Ns˜1,2
2 (w2,s˜1,2, w
∗
2,s˜1,2
), ..., x
Ns˜1,k
2 (w2,s˜1,k, w
∗
2,s˜1,k
)),
where
w2,s˜1 = (w2,s˜1,1, w2,s˜1,2, ..., w2,s˜1,k), (A12)
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and
w∗2,s˜1 = (w
∗
2,s˜1,1, w
∗
2,s˜1,2, ..., w
∗
2,s˜1,k). (A13)
Once the legitimate receiver receives yNs˜1 and sNs˜1 , he tries to find a unique quadruple (wˆ1,s˜1 , wˆ
∗
1,s˜1
, wˆ2,s˜1 , wˆ
∗
2,s˜1
)
such that (xNs˜11 (wˆ1,s˜1 , wˆ
∗
1,s˜1
), x
Ns˜1
2 (wˆ2,s˜1 , wˆ
∗
2,s˜1
), yNs˜1 , sNs˜1 ) are strongly jointly typical sequences [27], i.e.,
(x
Ns˜1
1 (wˆ1,s˜1 , wˆ
∗
1,s˜1), x
Ns˜1
2 (wˆ2,s˜1 , wˆ
∗
2,s˜1), y
Ns˜1 , sNs˜1 ) ∈ TNs˜1
X1,X2,S,Y |S˜1=s˜1(). (A14)
If there exists such a unique quadruple, the legitimate receiver declares that (wˆ1,s˜1 , wˆ
∗
1,s˜1
, wˆ2,s˜1 , wˆ
∗
2,s˜1
) is sent,
otherwise he declares an error. Using the Law of Large Numbers, it is easy to see that the ergodic state sequence
SNs˜1 satisfies
Pr{SNs˜1 ∈ TNs˜1S|s˜1()} → 1 (A15)
as Ns˜1 →∞. Based on the AEP, the construction of the codebooks, (A15), (A9), (A11) and (A14), the legitimate
receiver’s decoding error probability Pr{(wˆ1,s˜1 , wˆ∗1,s˜1 , wˆ2,s˜1 , wˆ∗2,s˜1) 6= (w1,s˜1 , w∗1,s˜1 , w2,s˜1 , w∗2,s˜1)} tends to 0 if
Ns˜1 →∞, and
R1(s˜1) +R
∗
1(s˜1) ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, S, S˜1 = s˜1), (A16)
R˜2(s˜1) + R˜
∗
2(s˜1) ≤ I(X2;Y |X1, S, S˜1 = s˜1), (A17)
R1(s˜1) +R
∗
1(s˜1) + R˜2(s˜1) + R˜
∗
2(s˜1) ≤ I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1 = s˜1). (A18)
Here note that R˜2(s˜1) and R˜∗2(s˜1) are the rates of the messages w2,s˜1 and w
∗
2,s˜1
, respectively, and they are given
by
R˜2(s˜1) =
∑k
s˜2=1
Ns˜1,s˜2R2(s˜1, s˜2)
Ns˜1
(a)
=
k∑
s˜2=1
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)R2(s˜1, s˜2)−
k∑
s˜2=1
R2(s˜1, s˜2)
1(1− kPS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1))
kNs˜1
, (A19)
R˜∗2(s˜1) =
∑k
s˜2=1
Ns˜1,s˜2R
∗
2(s˜1, s˜2)
Ns˜1
(b)
=
k∑
s˜2=1
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)R∗2(s˜1, s˜2)−
k∑
s˜2=1
R∗2(s˜1, s˜2)
1(1− kPS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1))
kNs˜1
, (A20)
where (a) and (b) are from (A1) and (A2). Hence substituting (A19) and (A20) into (A17) and (A18) and letting
Ns˜1 →∞, we have
k∑
s˜2=1
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)(R2(s˜1, s˜2) +R∗2(s˜1, s˜2)) ≤ I(X2;Y |X1, S, S˜1 = s˜1), (A21)
and
R1(s˜1) +R
∗
1(s˜1) +
k∑
s˜2=1
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)(R2(s˜1, s˜2) +R∗2(s˜1, s˜2)) ≤ I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1 = s˜1). (A22)
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Further combining (A16), (A21), (A22) with (A4), (A5), (A6) and (A7), we have
R1 +R
∗
1 =
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)(R1(s˜1) +R
∗
1(s˜1))
≤
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)I(X1;Y |X2, S, S˜1 = s˜1)
= I(X1;Y |X2, S, S˜1) = H(Y |X2, S, S˜1)−H(Y |X1, X2, S, S˜1)
(1)
= H(Y |X2, S, S˜1, S˜2)−H(Y |X1, X2, S, S˜1, S˜2) = I(X1;Y |X2, S, S˜1, S˜2), (A23)
R2 +R
∗
2 =
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)(
k∑
s˜2=1
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)(R2(s˜1, s˜2) +R∗2(s˜1, s˜2)))
≤
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)I(X2;Y |X1, S, S˜1 = s˜1)
= I(X2;Y |X1, S, S˜1) = H(Y |X1, S, S˜1)−H(Y |X1, X2, S, S˜1)
(2)
= H(Y |X1, S, S˜1, S˜2)−H(Y |X1, X2, S, S˜1, S˜2) = I(X2;Y |X1, S, S˜1, S˜2), (A24)
R1 +R
∗
1 +R2 +R
∗
2 =
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)(R1(s˜1) +R
∗
1(s˜1) +
k∑
s˜2=1
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)(R2(s˜1, s˜2) +R∗2(s˜1, s˜2)))
≤
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1 = s˜1)
= I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1) = H(Y |S, S˜1)−H(Y |X1, X2, S, S˜1)
(3)
= H(Y |S, S˜1, S˜2)−H(Y |X1, X2, S, S˜1, S˜2) = I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2), (A25)
where (1) is from the Markov chains S˜2 → (X2, S, S˜1) → Y and S˜2 → (X1, X2, S, S˜1) → Y , (2) is from the
Markov chains S˜2 → (X1, S, S˜1) → Y and S˜2 → (X1, X2, S, S˜1) → Y , and (3) is from S˜2 → (S, S˜1) → Y and
S˜2 → (X1, X2, S, S˜1)→ Y .
C. Equivocation analysis
First, we give a lower bound on H(XNs˜11 , X
Ns˜1
2 |W1,s˜1 ,W2,s˜1 , ZNs˜1 , SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1), which will be used in the
analysis of the eavesdropper’s equivocation about the transmitted messages W1 and W2. This conditional entropy can
be lower bounded by Fano’s inequality, which needs the guarantee that given zN , sN , w1 and w2, the eavesdropper’s
decoding error probability of the dummy messages w∗1 and w
∗
2 tends to 0. The eavesdropper’s decoding scheme is
described as follows.
Since the eavesdropper also knows the delayed feedback states S˜1, he can use it to demultiplex his received channel
output zN and the state sequence sN into outputs with respect to the sub-codebooks of the transmitters. Then, for
each s˜1 (1 ≤ s˜1 ≤ k), the eavesdropper has zNs˜1 , sNs˜1 , w1,s˜1 and w2,s˜1 = (w2,s˜1,1, ..., w2,s˜1,k), and he tries to find a
unique quadruple (w1,s˜1 , wˇ
∗
1,s˜1
, w2,s˜1 , wˇ
∗
2,s˜1
= (wˇ∗2,s˜1,1, ..., wˇ
∗
2,s˜1,k
)) such that (xNs˜11 (w1,s˜1 , wˇ
∗
1,s˜1
), x
Ns˜1
2 (w2,s˜1 , wˇ
∗
2,s˜1
), zNs˜1 , sNs˜1 )
are strongly jointly typical sequences, i.e.,
(x
Ns˜1
1 (w1,s˜1 , wˇ
∗
1,s˜1), x
Ns˜1
2 (w2,s˜1 , wˇ
∗
2,s˜1), z
Ns˜1 , sNs˜1 ) ∈ TNs˜1
X1,X2,S,Z|S˜1=s˜1(). (A26)
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If there exists such a unique quadruple, the eavesdropper declares that (w1,s˜1 , wˇ
∗
1,s˜1
, w2,s˜1 , wˇ
∗
2,s˜1
) is sent, otherwise
he declares an error. Based on the AEP, the construction of the codebooks, (A15), (A9) and (A11), the eavesdropper’s
decoding error probability Pr{(wˇ∗1,s˜1 , wˇ∗2,s˜1) 6= (w∗1,s˜1 , w∗2,s˜1)} tends to 0 if Ns˜1 →∞, and
R∗1(s˜1) ≤ I(X1;Z|X2, S, S˜1 = s˜1), (A27)
R˜∗2(s˜1) ≤ I(X2;Z|X1, S, S˜1 = s˜1), (A28)
R∗1(s˜1) + R˜
∗
2(s˜1) ≤ I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1 = s˜1), (A29)
where R˜∗2(s˜1) is given by (A20). Combining (A23), (A24), (A25) with (A4), (A5), (A6) and (A7), and letting
Ns˜1 →∞, we have
R∗1 =
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)R
∗
1(s˜1)
≤
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)I(X1;Z|X2, S, S˜1 = s˜1)
= I(X1;Z|X2, S, S˜1) = H(Z|X2, S, S˜1)−H(Z|X1, X2, S, S˜1)
(a)
= H(Z|X2, S, S˜1, S˜2)−H(Z|X1, X2, S, S˜1, S˜2) = I(X1;Z|X2, S, S˜1, S˜2), (A30)
R∗2 =
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)(
k∑
s˜2=1
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)R∗2(s˜1, s˜2))
≤
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)I(X2;Z|X1, S, S˜1 = s˜1)
= I(X2;Z|X1, S, S˜1) = H(Z|X1, S, S˜1)−H(Z|X1, X2, S, S˜1)
(b)
= H(Z|X1, S, S˜1, S˜2)−H(Z|X1, X2, S, S˜1, S˜2) = I(X2;Z|X1, S, S˜1, S˜2), (A31)
R∗1 +R
∗
2 =
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)(R
∗
1(s˜1) +
k∑
s˜2=1
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)R∗2(s˜1, s˜2))
≤
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1 = s˜1)
= I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1) = H(Z|S, S˜1)−H(Z|X1, X2, S, S˜1)
(c)
= H(Z|S, S˜1, S˜2)−H(Z|X1, X2, S, S˜1, S˜2) = I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2), (A32)
where (a) is from the Markov chains S˜2 → (X2, S, S˜1) → Z and S˜2 → (X1, X2, S, S˜1) → Z, (b) is from the
Markov chains S˜2 → (X1, S, S˜1) → Z and S˜2 → (X1, X2, S, S˜1) → Z, and (c) is from S˜2 → (S, S˜1) → Z and
S˜2 → (X1, X2, S, S˜1) → Z. Now it is easy to see that if (A30), (A31), (A32) are satisfied, the eavesdropper’s
decoding error probability of the dummy messages w∗1 and w
∗
2 tends to 0. Applying Fano’s inequality, hence we
have
1
Ns˜1
H(X
Ns˜1
1 , X
Ns˜1
2 |W1,s˜1 ,W2,s˜1 , ZNs˜1 , SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1) ≤ δ(2), (A33)
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where δ(2)→ 0 as Ns˜1 →∞.
Now we bound the eavesdropper’s equivocation ∆,
∆ =
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN , SN )
=
1
N
H(W1,1,W1,2, ...,W1,k,W2,1,1, ,W2,1,2, ..., ,W2,k,k|ZN , SN )
(a)
=
1
N
k∑
s˜1=1
H(W1,s˜1 ,W2,s˜1 |ZN , SN ,W1,1, ...,W1,s˜1−1,W2,1, ...,W2,s˜1−1)
≥ 1
N
k∑
s˜1=1
H(W1,s˜1 ,W2,s˜1 |ZN , SN ,W1,1, ...,W1,s˜1−1,W2,1, ...,W2,s˜1−1, S˜1 = s˜1)
(b)
=
1
N
k∑
s˜1=1
H(W1,s˜1 ,W2,s˜1 |ZNs˜1 , SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1)
=
1
N
k∑
s˜1=1
(H(W1,s˜1 ,W2,s˜1 , Z
Ns˜1 , SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1)−H(ZNs˜1 , SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1))
=
1
N
k∑
s˜1=1
(H(W1,s˜1 ,W2,s˜1 , X
Ns˜1
1 , X
Ns˜1
2 , Z
Ns˜1 , SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1)−H(XNs˜11 , XNs˜12 |W1,s˜1 ,W2,s˜1 , ZNs˜1 , SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1)
−H(ZNs˜1 , SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1))
(c)
=
1
N
k∑
s˜1=1
(H(ZNs˜1 |XNs˜11 , XNs˜12 , SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1) +H(XNs˜11 , XNs˜12 |SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1)
−H(XNs˜11 , XNs˜12 |W1,s˜1 ,W2,s˜1 , ZNs˜1 , SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1)−H(ZNs˜1 |SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1))
=
1
N
k∑
s˜1=1
(H(ZNs˜1 |XNs˜11 , XNs˜12 , SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1) +H(XNs˜11 |SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1) +H(XNs˜12 |XNs˜11 , SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1)
−H(XNs˜11 , XNs˜12 |W1,s˜1 ,W2,s˜1 , ZNs˜1 , SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1)−H(ZNs˜1 |SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1))
(d)
=
1
N
k∑
s˜1=1
(H(ZNs˜1 |XNs˜11 , XNs˜12 , SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1) +H(XNs˜11 |S˜1 = s˜1) +H(XNs˜12 |S˜1 = s˜1)
−H(XNs˜11 , XNs˜12 |W1,s˜1 ,W2,s˜1 , ZNs˜1 , SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1)−H(ZNs˜1 |SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1))
(e)
=
1
N
k∑
s˜1=1
(Ns˜1H(Z|X1, X2, S, S˜1 = s˜1) +H(XNs˜11 |S˜1 = s˜1) +H(XNs˜12 |S˜1 = s˜1)
−H(XNs˜11 , XNs˜12 |W1,s˜1 ,W2,s˜1 , ZNs˜1 , SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1)−H(ZNs˜1 |SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1))
(f)
=
1
N
k∑
s˜1=1
(Ns˜1H(Z|X1, X2, S, S˜1 = s˜1) +Ns˜1(R1(s˜1) +R∗1(s˜1))− 1 +Ns˜1(R˜2(s˜1) + R˜∗2(s˜1))− 1
−H(XNs˜11 , XNs˜12 |W1,s˜1 ,W2,s˜1 , ZNs˜1 , SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1)−H(ZNs˜1 |SNs˜1 , S˜1 = s˜1))
(g)
≥ 1
N
k∑
s˜1=1
(Ns˜1H(Z|X1, X2, S, S˜1 = s˜1) +Ns˜1(R1(s˜1) +R∗1(s˜1))− 1 +Ns˜1(R˜2(s˜1) + R˜∗2(s˜1))− 1
−Ns˜1δ(2)−Ns˜1H(Z|S, S˜1 = s˜1))
(h)
=
1
N
k∑
s˜1=1
(Ns˜1H(Z|X1, X2, S, S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2) +Ns˜1(R1(s˜1) +R∗1(s˜1))− 1 +Ns˜1(R˜2(s˜1) + R˜∗2(s˜1))− 1
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−Ns˜1δ(2)−Ns˜1H(Z|S, S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2))
(i)
=
k∑
s˜1=1
(PS˜1(s˜1)−
1
N
)(R1(s˜1) +R
∗
1(s˜1) + R˜2(s˜1) + R˜
∗
2(s˜1)−
2
Ns˜1
+H(Z|X1, X2, S, S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2)
−H(Z|S, S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2)− δ(2))
(j)
=
k∑
s˜1=1
(PS˜1(s˜1)−
1
N
)(R1(s˜1) +R
∗
1(s˜1) +
k∑
s˜2=1
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)(R2(s˜1, s˜2) +R∗2(s˜1, s˜2))
−
k∑
s˜2=1
1(1− kPS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1))
k(NPS˜1(s˜1)− 1)
(R2(s˜1, s˜2) +R
∗
2(s˜1, s˜2))−
2
Ns˜1
− I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2)− δ(2))
(k)
= R1 +R
∗
1 +R2 +R
∗
2 − I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2)−
k∑
s˜1=1
PS˜1(s˜1)
k∑
s˜2=1
1(1− kPS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1))
k(NPS˜1(s˜1)− 1)
(R2(s˜1, s˜2) +R
∗
2(s˜1, s˜2))
−δ(2)− 1
N
k∑
s˜1=1
(R1(s˜1) +R
∗
1(s˜1)− I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2))
− 1
N
k∑
s˜1=1
k∑
s˜2=1
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)(R2(s˜1, s˜2) +R∗2(s˜1, s˜2))
− 1
N
k∑
s˜1=1
k∑
s˜2=1
1(kPS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)− 1)
k(NPS˜1(s˜1)− 1)
(R2(s˜1, s˜2) +R
∗
2(s˜1, s˜2))−
2k − k1δ(2)
N
, (A34)
where (a) is from the definition W2,s˜1 = (W2,s˜1,1, ...,W2,s˜1,k) and the chain rule, (b) is from the fact that the mes-
sages W1,s˜1 and W2,s˜1 depend only on the s˜1-th sub-codebooks and the corresponding channel inputs and outputs,
i.e., the Markov chain (W1,1, ...,W1,s˜1−1,W2,1, ...,W2,s˜1−1, Z
N1 , ..., ZNs˜−1 , ZNs˜+1 , ..., ZNk , SN1 , ..., SNs˜−1 ,
SNs˜+1 , ..., SNk)→ (ZNs˜ , SNs˜ , S˜1 = s˜1)→ (W1,s˜1 ,W2,s˜1) holds, (c) is from H(W1,s˜1 |XNs˜11 ) = 0 and
H(W2,s˜1 |XNs˜12 ) = 0, (d) is from the fact that given S˜1 = s˜1, XNs˜12 is independent of XNs˜11 and SNs˜1 , and given
S˜1 = s˜1, X
Ns˜1
1 is independent of S
Ns˜1 , (e) is from the fact that the channel is discrete memoryless, and the
codewords XNs˜11 and X
Ns˜1
2 are i.i.d. generated, (f) is from the fact that for each s˜1, there are 2
Ns˜1 (R1(s˜1)+R
∗
1(s˜1))
of XNs˜11 , and 2
Ns˜1 (R˜2(s˜1)+R˜
∗
2(s˜1)) of XNs˜12 , and applying a similar lemma in [3], we have
1
Ns˜
H(X
Ns˜1
1 |S˜1 = s˜1) ≥
1
Ns˜
log 2Ns˜1 (R1(s˜1)+R
∗
1(s˜1)) − 1
Ns˜
, (A35)
1
Ns˜
H(X
Ns˜1
2 |S˜1 = s˜1) ≥
1
Ns˜
log 2Ns˜1 (R˜2(s˜1)+R˜
∗
2(s˜1)) − 1
Ns˜
, (A36)
where R˜2(s˜1) and R˜∗2(s˜1) are defined in (A19) and (A20), respectively, (g) follows from (A33), (h) is from the
Markov chains S˜2 → (X1, X2, S, S˜1 = s˜1) → Z and S˜2 → (S, S˜1 = s˜1) → Z, (i) is from the definition (A1), (j)
follows from (A19) and (A20), and (k) follows from the definitions of R1, R∗1, R2 and R
∗
2, see (A4), (A5), (A6)
and (A7).
From (A34), we can conclude that
∆ ≥ R1 +R∗1 +R2 +R∗2 − I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2)−  (A37)
for sufficiently large N . Letting
R∗1 +R
∗
2 ≥ I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2), (A38)
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∆ ≥ R1 +R2 −  is proved.
Combining (A23), (A24), (A25), (A30), (A31) and (A32) with (A38), and applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination
[28] to eliminate R∗1 and R
∗
2, the region R∗ is obtained. Finally, using a standard time sharing technique presented
in [17, p.3438], Theorem 3 is proved.
The proof of Theorem 3 is completed.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Theorem 4 is proved by showing that for any achievable secrecy rate pair (R1, R2), the inequalities R1 ≤
I(V1;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2) − I(V1;Z|U, S, S˜1, S˜2), R2 ≤ I(V2;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2) − I(V2;Z|U, S, S˜1, S˜2) and R1 + R2 ≤
I(V1, V2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2, U)− I(V1, V2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, U) holds. Here the random variables U , V1, V2, S, S˜1, S˜2, Y and
Z are denoted by
U , (Y J−1, ZNJ+1, SN , J), V1 , (U,W1), V2 , (U,W2), Y , YJ , Z , ZJ
S , SJ , S˜1 , SJ−d1 , S˜2 , SJ−d2 , (A39)
where the uniformly distributed random variable J takes values in the set {1, 2, , ..., N}, and it is independent of
Y N , ZN , W1, W2 and SN .
Proof of R1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(V1;Z|U, S, S˜1, S˜2):
First, note that the joint secrecy ensures the individual secrecy, and thus we have
R1 −  ≤ 1
N
H(W1|ZN , SN )
=
1
N
(H(W1)− I(W1;ZN , SN )) (a)= 1
N
(H(W1)− I(W1;ZN |SN ))
(b)
=
1
N
(H(W1|SN )−H(W1|Y N , SN ) +H(W1|Y N , SN )− I(W1;ZN |SN ))
(c)
≤ 1
N
(I(W1;Y
N |SN ) + δ(Pe)− I(W1;ZN |SN ))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1;Yi|Y i−1, SN )− I(W1;Zi|ZNi+1, SN )) +
δ(Pe)
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1;Yi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1)− I(W1;Zi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1) + I(Yi;ZNi+1|Y i−1, SN )− I(Zi;Y i−1|ZNi+1, SN )
−I(Yi;ZNi+1|W1, Y i−1, SN ) + I(Zi;Y i−1|W1, ZNi+1, SN )) +
δ(Pe)
N
(d)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1;Yi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1)− I(W1;Zi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(e)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1;Yi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)− I(W1;Zi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(f)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(V1,i;Yi|Ui, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)− I(V1,i;Zi|Ui, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)) +
δ(Pe)
N
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(g)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(V1,i;Yi|Ui, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2 , J = i)− I(V1,i;Zi|Ui, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2 , J = i)) +
δ(Pe)
N
= I(V1,J ;YJ |UJ , SJ , SJ−d1 , SJ−d2 , J)− I(V1,J ;ZJ |UJ , SJ , SJ−d1 , SJ−d2 , J) +
δ(Pe)
N
(h)
= I(V1;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(V1;Z|U, S, S˜1, S˜2) + δ(Pe)
N
(i)
≤ I(V1;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(V1;Z|U, S, S˜1, S˜2) + δ()
N
, (A40)
where (a) and (b) follow from the fact that W1 is independent of SN , (c) follows from Fano’s inequality, (d) is
from Csisza´r’s equality [3], i.e.,
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|Y i−1, SN ) = I(Zi;Y i−1|ZNi+1, SN ), (A41)
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|W1, Y i−1, SN ) = I(Zi;Y i−1|W1, ZNi+1, SN ), (A42)
(e) follows from the fact that Si, Si−d1 and Si−d2 are included in S
N , hence we have H(Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2 |SN ) = 0,
and here note that Si−d1 = const (or Si−d2 = const) when i ≤ d1 (or i ≤ d2), (f) follows from the definitions
Ui = (Y
i−1, SN , ZNi+1) and V1,i = (W1, Y
i−1, SN , ZNi+1), (g) follows from J is a uniformly distributed random
variable which takes values in the set {1, 2, ..., N}, and it is independent of Y N , ZN , W1, W2 and SN , (h) is
from the definitions in (A39), and (i) follows from the fact that δ(Pe) is a monotonic increasing function of Pe
and Pe ≤ . Then, letting → 0, the bound R1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(V1;Z|U, S, S˜1, S˜2) is obtained.
Proof of R1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(V1;Z|U, S, S˜1, S˜2):
The proof of R2 ≤ I(V2;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)−I(V2;Z|U, S, S˜1, S˜2) is analogous to the proof of R1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)−
I(V1;Z|U, S, S˜1, S˜2), and thus we omit the proof here.
Proof of R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1, V2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2, U)− I(V1, V2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, U):
Note that
R1 +R2 −  ≤ 1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN , SN )
=
1
N
(H(W1,W2)− I(W1,W2;ZN , SN )) (a)= 1
N
(H(W1,W2)− I(W1,W2;ZN |SN ))
(b)
=
1
N
(H(W1,W2|SN )−H(W1,W2|Y N , SN ) +H(W1,W2|Y N , SN )− I(W1,W2;ZN |SN ))
(c)
≤ 1
N
(I(W1,W2;Y
N |SN ) + δ(Pe)− I(W1,W2;ZN |SN ))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1,W2;Yi|Y i−1, SN )− I(W1,W2;Zi|ZNi+1, SN )) +
δ(Pe)
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1,W2;Yi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1)− I(W1,W2;Zi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1) + I(Yi;ZNi+1|Y i−1, SN )
−I(Zi;Y i−1|ZNi+1, SN )− I(Yi;ZNi+1|W1,W2, Y i−1, SN ) + I(Zi;Y i−1|W1,W2, ZNi+1, SN )) +
δ(Pe)
N
(d)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1,W2;Yi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1)− I(W1,W2;Zi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1)) +
δ(Pe)
N
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(e)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1,W2;Yi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)
−I(W1,W2;Zi|Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(f)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(V1,i, V2,i;Yi|Ui, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)− I(V1,i, V2,i;Zi|Ui, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(g)
= I(V1,J , V2,J ;YJ |UJ , SJ , SJ−d1 , SJ−d2 , J)− I(V1,J , V2,J ;ZJ |UJ , SJ , SJ−d1 , SJ−d2 , J) +
δ(Pe)
N
(h)
= I(V1, V2;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(V1, V2;Z|U, S, S˜1, S˜2) + δ(Pe)
N
(i)
≤ I(V1, V2;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(V1, V2;Z|U, S, S˜1, S˜2) + δ()
N
, (A43)
where (a) and (b) follow from the fact that SN is independent of W1 and W2, (c) follows from Fano’s inequality,
(d) is from Csisza´r’s equality [3], i.e.,
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|Y i−1, SN ) = I(Zi;Y i−1|ZNi+1, SN ), (A44)
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|W1,W2, Y i−1, SN ) = I(Zi;Y i−1|W1,W2, ZNi+1, SN ), (A45)
(e) follows from the fact that Si, Si−d1 and Si−d2 are included in S
N , (f) follows from the definitions Ui =
(Y i−1, SN , ZNi+1), V1,i = (W1, Y
i−1, SN , ZNi+1) and V2,i = (W2, Y
i−1, SN , ZNi+1), (g) follows from J is a uni-
formly distributed random variable which takes values in {1, 2, ..., N}, and it is independent of Y N , ZN , W1, W2 and
SN , (h) is from the definitions in (A39), and (i) follows from the fact that δ(Pe) is a monotonic increasing function
of Pe and Pe ≤ . Then, letting → 0, the bound R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1, V2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2, U)− I(V1, V2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, U)
is obtained.
The proof of Theorem 4 is completed.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THE OUTER BOUND ON THE SECRECY CAPACITY REGION OF THE DEGRADED CASE OF THE
FS-MAC-WT WITH ONLY DELAYED STATE FEEDBACK
In this section, we will show that for the degraded case (XN1 , X
N
2 , S
N )→ Y N → ZN , all the achievable secrecy
rate pairs (R1, R2) of the FS-MAC-WT with only delayed state feedback are contained in the following region
Cd−outs = {(R1, R2) : 0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− I(X1;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q),
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1, S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− I(X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q),
0 ≤ R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)},
where the joint probability satisfies
PQSS˜1S˜2X1X2Y Z(q, s, s˜1, s˜2, x1, x2, y, z)
= PZ|Y (z|y)PY |X1,X2,S(y|x1, x2, s)PX1X2SS˜1S˜2Q(x1, x2, s, s˜1, s˜2, q). (A46)
Proof of R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− I(X1;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q):
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Note that
R1 −  ≤ 1
N
H(W1|ZN , SN )
=
1
N
(H(W1|ZN , SN )−H(W1|ZN , SN , Y N ,W2) +H(W1|ZN , SN , Y N ,W2))
(a)
≤ 1
N
(H(W1|ZN , SN )−H(W1|ZN , SN , Y N ,W2) + δ(Pe))
=
1
N
(I(W1;Y
N ,W2|ZN , SN ) + δ(Pe))
(b)
≤ 1
N
(I(XN1 ;Y
N ,W2|ZN , SN ) + δ(Pe))
(c)
≤ 1
N
(I(XN1 ;Y
N , XN2 |ZN , SN ) + δ(Pe))
(d)
=
1
N
(H(XN1 |ZN , SN )−H(XN1 |SN , Y N , XN2 ) + δ(Pe))
(e)
=
1
N
(H(XN1 |ZN , SN )−H(XN1 |SN , Y N , XN2 ) +H(XN1 |XN2 , SN )−H(XN1 |SN ) + δ(Pe))
=
1
N
(I(XN1 ;Y
N |XN2 , SN )− I(XN1 ;ZN |SN ) + δ(Pe))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1, XN2 , SN )−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Si)
−H(Zi|Zi−1, SN ) +H(Zi|Zi−1, SN , XN1 )) +
δ(Pe)
N
(f)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1, XN2 , SN , Zi−1)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Si, Zi−1, SN )
−H(Zi|Zi−1, SN ) +H(Zi|Zi−1, SN , XN1 )) +
δ(Pe)
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|X2,i, SN , Zi−1)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Si, Zi−1, SN )
−H(Zi|Zi−1, SN ) +H(Zi|Zi−1, SN , X1,i)) + δ(Pe)
N
(g)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|X2,i, SN , Zi−1, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Si, Zi−1, SN , Si−d1 , Si−d2)
−H(Zi|Zi−1, SN , Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2) +H(Zi|Zi−1, SN , X1,i, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(h)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|X2,i, Qi, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Si, Qi, Si−d1 , Si−d2)
−H(Zi|Qi, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2) +H(Zi|Qi, X1,i, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(i)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|X2,i, Qi, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2 , J = i)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Si, Qi, Si−d1 , Si−d2 , J = i)
−H(Zi|Qi, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2 , J = i) +H(Zi|Qi, X1,i, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2 , J = i)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(j)
= H(YJ |X2,J , QJ , SJ , SJ−d1 , SJ−d2 , J)−H(YJ |X1,J , X2,J , SJ , QJ , SJ−d1 , SJ−d2 , J)
−H(Zi|QJ , SJ , SJ−d1 , SJ−d2 , J) +H(ZJ |QJ , X1,J , SJ , SJ−d1 , SJ−d2 , J) +
δ(Pe)
N
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(k)
= I(X1;Y |X2, Q, S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(X1;Z|Q,S, S˜1, S˜2) + δ(Pe)
N
(l)
≤ I(X1;Y |X2, Q, S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(X1;Z|Q,S, S˜1, S˜2) + δ()
N
, (A47)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, (b) is from the fact that H(W1|XN1 ) = 0, (c) is from H(W2|XN2 ) = 0,
(d) is from the Markov chain XN1 → (SN , Y N , XN2 ) → ZN , (e) follows from the fact that given SN , XN1
is independent of XN2 , (f) follows from the Markov chains Yi → (Y i−1, XN2 , SN ) → Zi−1, (Zi−1, SN ) →
(X1,i, X2,i, Si)→ Yi, (g) follows from the fact that H(Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2 |SN ) = 0, and here note that Si−d1 = const
(or Si−d2 = const) when i ≤ d1 (or i ≤ d2), (h) is from the definition Qi = (Zi−1, SN ), (i) and (j) follow from
J is a uniformly distributed random variable which takes values in the set {1, 2, ..., N}, and it is independent of
XN1 , X
N
2 , Y
N , ZN , W1, W2 and SN , (k) is from the definitions Q , (QJ , J) = (ZJ−1, SN , J), X1 , X1,J ,
X2 , X2,J , Y , YJ , Z , ZJ , S , SJ , S˜1 , SJ−d1 and S˜2 , SJ−d2 , and (l) follows from δ(Pe) is a monotonic
increasing function of Pe and Pe ≤ . Letting  → 0, R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, S, S˜1, S˜2, Q) − I(X1;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q) is
proved.
Proof of R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1, S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− I(X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q):
The proof of R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1, S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− I(X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q) is analogous to that of
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− I(X1;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q), and thus we omit it here.
Proof of R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q):
Note that
R1 +R2 −  ≤ 1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN , SN )
(1)
≤ 1
N
(I(W1,W2;Y
N |ZN , SN ) + δ(Pe))
(2)
≤ 1
N
(I(XN1 , X
N
2 ;Y
N |ZN , SN ) + δ(Pe))
(3)
=
1
N
(H(XN1 , X
N
2 |ZN , SN )−H(XN1 , XN2 |Y N , SN )−H(XN1 , XN2 |SN )
+H(XN1 , X
N
2 |SN ) + δ(Pe))
=
1
N
(I(XN1 , X
N
2 ;Y
N |SN )− I(XN1 , XN2 ;ZN |SN ) + δ(Pe))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1, SN )−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Si)
−H(Zi|Zi−1, SN ) +H(Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Si)) + δ(Pe)
N
(4)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1, SN , Zi−1)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Si, SN , Zi−1)
−H(Zi|Zi−1, SN ) +H(Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Si, SN , Zi−1)) + δ(Pe)
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|SN , Zi−1)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Si, SN , Zi−1)
−H(Zi|Zi−1, SN ) +H(Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Si, SN , Zi−1)) + δ(Pe)
N
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(5)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|SN , Zi−1, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Si, SN , Zi−1, Si−d1 , Si−d2)
−H(Zi|Zi−1, SN , Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2) +H(Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Si, SN , Zi−1, Si−d1 , Si−d2)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(6)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Qi, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2 , J = i)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Si, Qi, Si−d1 , Si−d2 , J = i)
−H(Zi|Qi, Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2 , J = i) +H(Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Si, Qi, Si−d1 , Si−d2 , J = i)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(7)
= I(X1, X2;Y |Q,S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(X1, X2;Z|Q,S, S˜1, S˜2) + δ(Pe)
N
(8)
≤ I(X1, X2;Y |Q,S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(X1, X2;Z|Q,S, S˜1, S˜2) + δ()
N
, (A48)
where (1) follows from Fano’s inequality, (2) follows from the fact that H(W1|XN1 ) = 0 and H(W2|XN2 ) = 0, (3) is
from the Markov chain (XN1 , X
N
2 )→ (SN , Y N )→ ZN , (4) follows from the Markov chains Yi → (Y i−1, SN )→
Zi−1, (Zi−1, SN ) → (X1,i, X2,i, Si) → Yi and (Zi−1, SN ) → (X1,i, X2,i, Si) → Zi, (5) follows from the fact
that H(Si, Si−d1 , Si−d2 |SN ) = 0, (6) is from the definition Qi = (Zi−1, SN ), and J is a uniformly distributed
random variable which takes values in the set {1, 2, ..., N}, and it is independent of XN1 , XN2 , Y N , ZN , W1,
W2 and SN , (7) follows from the definitions Q , (QJ , J) = (ZJ−1, SN , J), X1 , X1,J , X2 , X2,J , Y , YJ ,
Z , ZJ , S , SJ , S˜1 , SJ−d1 and S˜2 , SJ−d2 , and (8) follows from δ(Pe) is a monotonic increasing function
of Pe and Pe ≤ . Letting → 0, R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q) is proved.
The proof of the outer bound for the degraded case of the FS-MAC-WT with only delayed state feedback is
completed.
APPENDIX F
THE DERIVATION OF COROLLARY 2
First, we explicitly compute the upper bound on the secrecy sum rate of C(dg−out)s . For the discrete memoryless
degraded FS-MAC-WT with only delayed state feedback, we have shown that the outer bound Cd−outs is given by
Cd−outs = {(R1, R2) : 0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− I(X1;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q),
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1, S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− I(X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q),
0 ≤ R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)}.
Then for the sum rate, we have
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)
(1)
= h(Y |S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− h(Y |X1, X2, S, S˜1, S˜2)− h(Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q) + h(Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, X1, X2)
(2)
≤ h(Y |S, S˜1, S˜2)− h(Y |X1, X2, S, S˜1, S˜2)− h(Z|S, S˜1, S˜2) + h(Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, X1, X2)
= I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2), (A49)
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where (1) is from the Markov chains Q → (S, S˜1, S˜2, X1, X2) → Y and Q → (S, S˜1, S˜2, X1, X2) → Z, and (2)
is from
h(Y |S, S˜1, S˜2, Q)− h(Z|S, S˜1, S˜2, Q) ≤ h(Y |S, S˜1, S˜2)− h(Z|S, S˜1, S˜2). (A50)
Here note that (A50) can be re-written as
I(Q;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2) ≤ I(Q;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2), (A51)
and from Q→ (S, S˜1, S˜2, Y )→ Z, it is easy to see that (A51) holds. Hence the secrecy sum rate of C(dg−out)s is
bounded by
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2), (A52)
subject to the power constraints ∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)E[X
2
1 |s˜1] ≤ P1, (A53)
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)E[X22 |s˜1, s˜2] ≤ P2. (A54)
Similar to the power definition in [16], let P1(s˜1) and P2(s˜1, s˜2) be the power respectively allocated to the states s˜1
and s˜2, i.e., P1(s˜1) = E[X21 |s˜1] and P2(s˜1, s˜2) = E[X22 |s˜1, s˜2]. Moreover, let h(Z) be the differential entropy of
the continuous random variable Z. Then, we can bound I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2) in (A52)
as follows.
I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2)− I(X1, X2;Z|S, S˜1, S˜2)
=
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)(I(X1, X2;Y |S = s, S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2 = s˜2)−
I(X1, X2;Z|S = s, S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2 = s˜2))
=
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)(h(Y |s, s˜1, s˜2)− h(Ns|s)− h(Z|s, s˜1, s˜2) + h(h3(s)Ns +Nw|s))
(b)
≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)(h(Y |s, s˜1, s˜2)− h(Ns|s)
−1
2
log(22h(h3(s)Y |s,s˜1,s˜2) + 22h(Nw)) + h(h3(s)Ns +Nw|s))
(c)
=
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)(h(Y |s, s˜1, s˜2)− h(Ns|s)
−1
2
log(22h(Y |s,s˜1,s˜2)h23(s) + 2
2h(Nw)) + h(h3(s)Ns +Nw|s))
(d)
=
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)(h(Y |s, s˜1, s˜2)−
1
2
log(2pieσ2s)
−1
2
log(22h(Y |s,s˜1,s˜2)h23(s) + 2pieσ
2
w) +
1
2
log(2pie(h23(s)σ
2
s + σ
2
w))
(e)
≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)(
1
2
log(2pieE[(h1(s)X1 + h2(s)X2 +Ns)
2|s, s˜1, s˜2])− 1
2
log(2pieσ2s)
42
−1
2
log(2pieE[(h1(s)X1 + h2(s)X2 +Ns)
2|s, s˜1, s˜2]h23(s) + 2pieσ2w) +
1
2
log(2pie(h23(s)σ
2
s + σ
2
w))
(f)
=
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)(
1
2
log(2pie(h21(s)P1(s˜1) + h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2) + σ2s))−
1
2
log(2pieσ2s)
−1
2
log(2pie(h21(s)P1(s˜1) + h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2) + σ2s)h23(s) + 2pieσ2w) +
1
2
log(2pie(h23(s)σ
2
s + σ
2
w))
=
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)(
1
2
log(1 +
h21(s)P1(s˜1) + h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2)
σ2s
)
−1
2
log(1 +
h23(s)h
2
1(s)P1(s˜1) + h23(s)h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2)
h23(s)σ
2
s + σ
2
w
)), (A55)
where (b) follows from the entropy power inequality 22h(h3(s)Y+Nw|s,s˜1,s˜2) ≥ 22h(h3(s)Y |s,s˜1,s˜2)+22h(Nw|s,s˜1,s˜2) and
the fact that Nw is independent of S, S˜1 and S˜2, (c) follows from the property h(aX) = h(X)+log a for a constant
a, (d) follows from Ns ∼ N (0, σ2s) and Nw ∼ N (0, σ2w), (e) follows from h(Y |s, s˜1, s˜2) ≤ 12 log(2pieE[(h1(s)X1+
h2(s)X2 +Ns)
2|s, s˜1, s˜2]) and the fact that h(Y |s, s˜1, s˜2)− 12 log(22h(Y |s,s˜1,s˜2)h23(s) + 2pieσ2w) is increasing while
h(Y |s, s˜1, s˜2) is increasing, and (f) follows from the definitions P1(s˜1) = E[X21 |s˜1] and P2(s˜1, s˜2) = E[X22 |s˜1, s˜2].
Now for the degraded Gaussian fading FS-MAC-WT with only delayed state feedback, we have the following
result on the secrecy sum rate of C(dg−out)s :
R1 +R2
≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)(
1
2
log(1 +
h21(s)P1(s˜1) + h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2)
σ2s
)
−1
2
log(1 +
h23(s)h
2
1(s)P1(s˜1) + h23(s)h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2)
h23(s)σ
2
s + σ
2
w
))
=
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
s
Kd2(s, s˜2)(
1
2
log(1 +
h21(s)P1(s˜1) + h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2)
σ2s
)
−1
2
log(1 +
h23(s)h
2
1(s)P1(s˜1) + h23(s)h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2)
h23(s)σ
2
s + σ
2
w
)) (A56)
subject to the power constraints ∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)P1(s˜1) ≤ P1, (A57)
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)P2(s˜1, s˜2) ≤ P2. (A58)
Then, analogously, the transmission rate R1 in C(dg−out)s can be upper bounded by
R1 ≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
s
Kd2(s, s˜2)(
1
2
log(1 +
h21(s)P1(s˜1)
σ2s
)
−1
2
log(
h21(s)P1(s˜1) + σ2s + σ2w
h23(s)h
2
2(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2) + h23σ2s + σ2w
)) (A59)
subject to the power constraint in (A57) and (A58), and R2 in C(dg−out)s can be upper bounded by
R2 ≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
s
Kd2(s, s˜2)(
1
2
log(1 +
h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2)
σ2s
)
−1
2
log(
h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2) + σ2s + σ2w
h23(s)h
2
1(s)P1(s˜1) + h23σ2s + σ2w
)) (A60)
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subject to the power constraint in (A57) and (A58).
APPENDIX G
THE DERIVATION OF COROLLARY 4
First, we compute the upper bound on the secrecy sum rate of C(dg−out)sf . From Theorem 2, we know that
R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(V1, V2;Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2), H(Y |Z,U, S, S˜1, S˜2)}
= min{H(Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)−H(Y |V1, V2, U, S, S˜1, S˜2), H(Y |Z,U, S, S˜1, S˜2)}
≤ min{H(Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)−H(Y |X1, X2, V1, V2, U, S, S˜1, S˜2), H(Y |Z,U, S, S˜1, S˜2)}
(1)
= min{H(Y |U, S, S˜1, S˜2)−H(Y |X1, X2, S, S˜1, S˜2), H(Y |Z,U, S, S˜1, S˜2)}
≤ min{H(Y |S, S˜1, S˜2)−H(Y |X1, X2, S, S˜1, S˜2), H(Y |Z, S, S˜1, S˜2)}
= min{I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2), H(Y |Z, S, S˜1, S˜2)}, (A61)
where (1) is from the Markov chain (V1, V2, U) → (S, S˜1, S˜2, X1, X2) → Y . Now it remains to compute
I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2) and H(Y |Z, S, S˜1, S˜2) in (A61), respectively. First, we bound the conditional mutual
information I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2), and it is given by
I(X1, X2;Y |S, S˜1, S˜2)
=
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)I(X1, X2;Y |S = s, S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2 = s˜2)
=
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)(h(h1(s)X1 + h2(s)X2 +Ns|s, s˜1, s˜2)− h(Ns|s))
(2)
≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)
1
2
log(1 +
h21(s)P1(s˜1) + h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2)
σ2s
), (A62)
where (2) is from the definitions P1(s˜1) = E[X21 |s˜1] and P2(s˜1, s˜2) = E[X22 |s˜1, s˜2].
Then, we bound the conditional entropy H(Y |Z, S, S˜1, S˜2), and it is given by
H(Y |Z, S, S˜1, S˜2)
=
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)h(Y |Z, S = s, S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2 = s˜2)
=
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)(h(Y,Z, S = s, S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2 = s˜2)− h(Z, S = s, S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2 = s˜2))
(4)
=
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)(h(Z|Y ) + h(Y, S = s, S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2 = s˜2)− h(Z, S = s, S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2 = s˜2))
=
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)(h(Z|Y ) + h(Y |S = s, S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2 = s˜2)− h(Z|S = s, S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2 = s˜2))
(5)
≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)(h(Nw) + h(Y |S = s, S˜1 = s˜1, S˜2 = s˜2)
−1
2
log(22h(Y |s,s˜1,s˜2)h23(s) + 2
2h(Nw)))
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(6)
≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)(
1
2
log(2pieσ2w) +
1
2
log(2pie(h21(s)P1(s˜1) + h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2) + σ2s))
−1
2
log(2pie(h21(s)P1(s˜1) + h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2) + σ2s)h23(s) + 2pieσ2w)
=
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
PS˜2|S˜1(s˜2|s˜1)
∑
s
PS|S˜2(s|s˜2)(
1
2
log(2pieσ2w)
+
1
2
log(
h21(s)P1(s˜1) + h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2) + σ2s
h23(s)(h
2
1(s)P1(s˜1) + h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2) + σ2s) + σ2w
)), (A63)
where (4) is from the Markov chain (S, S˜1, S˜2)→ Y → Z, (5) is from the entropy power inequality 22h(h3(s)Y+Nw|s,s˜1,s˜2) ≥
22h(h3(s)Y |s,s˜1,s˜2) + 22h(Nw|s,s˜1,s˜2), the property h(aX) = h(X) + log a for a constant a and the fact that Nw is
independent of S, S˜1 and S˜2, and (6) is from h(Nw) = 12 log(2pieσ
2
w), h(Y |s, s˜1, s˜2) ≤ 12 log(2pieE[(h1(s)X1 +
h2(s)X2 + Ns)
2|s, s˜1, s˜2]), P1(s˜1) = E[X21 |s˜1], P2(s˜1, s˜2) = E[X22 |s˜1, s˜2] and the fact that h(Y |s, s˜1, s˜2) −
1
2 log(2
2h(Y |s,s˜1,s˜2)h23(s) + 2
2h(Nw)) is increasing while h(Y |s, s˜1, s˜2) is increasing.
From (A61), (A62) and (A63), we have the following result:
R1 +R2
≤ min{
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
s
Kd2(s, s˜2)
1
2
log(1 +
h21(s)P1(s˜1) + h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2)
σ2s
),
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
s
Kd2(s, s˜2)(
1
2
log(2pieσ2w)
+
1
2
log(
h21(s)P1(s˜1) + h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2) + σ2s
h23(s)(h
2
1(s)P1(s˜1) + h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2) + σ2s) + σ2w
))} (A64)
subject to the power constraints in (A57) and (A58).
Then, analogously, the transmission rate R1 in C(dg−out)sf can be upper bounded by
R1 ≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
s
Kd2(s, s˜2)
1
2
log(1 +
h21(s)P1(s˜1) + h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2)
σ2s
)
(A65)
subject to the power constraints in (A57) and (A58), and R2 in C(dg−out)sf can be upper bounded by
R2 ≤
∑
s˜1
pi(s˜1)
∑
s˜2
Kd1−d2(s˜2, s˜1)
∑
s
Kd2(s, s˜2)
1
2
log(1 +
h21(s)P1(s˜1) + h22(s)P2(s˜1, s˜2)
σ2s
)
(A66)
subject to the power constraints in (A57) and (A58).
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